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ABSTRACT
Labor Market Issues for Administrators:
Evidence from Public Schools in Texas. (August 2007)
Eric John Mitchem, B.A., Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
Co–Chairs of Advisory Committee: Dr. Manuelita Ureta
Dr. Donald Deere
This dissertation examines three labor market issues regarding public school
administrators in Texas using personnel records from the 1994-95 school year until
the 2003-04 school year. The first essay explores promotion rates of men and women
to school principal, a position that requires certification. I find ignoring gender dif-
ferences in desire for promotion yields results similar to the existing literature: men
hold an advantage in the promotion process. However, restricting the analysis to only
those individuals who have expressed interest in an administrative position, those who
became trained and certified as a principal, I find men and women face no statistically
significant difference in the probability of promotion. Duration analysis shows that
although men are most often promoted four years after they become certified and
women are most often promoted six to seven years after becoming certified, women
face a much higher hazard of promotion than men. This cannot be explained by a
higher exit rate from the education sector by men.
The second essay examines the effect of restrictive licensing on the quality of
the entrants into a profession. Theory suggests that requiring minimum competency
standards truncates the low end of the quality distribution, however, increased costs
of entry encourage talented potential entrants to pursue outside opportunities. Using
the public school principal profession in Texas and measuring teacher quality by
iv
changes in student achievement, I find evidence that lower entry costs increase the
quality of entrants. As a robustness check, I categorize observations geographically
into control and treatment groups to ensure the estimated effect is a result of reduced
entry costs and not unobserved factors.
The third essay examines the effect of increased school choice on the earnings
and abilities of school administrators. I find an overall positive effect of competition
on administrators’ earnings suggesting that productivity gains from hiring talented
managers outweigh the pressure to reduce costs by cutting salaries. However, the
results are sensitive to the level of competition, the type of labor market, and the
administrators’ position. I control for possible endogeneity both mechanically and
with outside instruments and my conclusions are largely unchanged.
vThis dissertation is dedicated to my father: Johnny E. Mitchem.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Many people have studied teacher labor markets, interested in factors that may in-
crease the quality of education within a state or country. Few, however, have consid-
ered issues facing school administrators. This dissertation attempts to broaden our
knowledge of public school administrators, some of the choices they make, and some
of the factors that influence those choices.
In Chapter II, I explore differences in promotion rates between men and women
in Texas public schools. In the late 1990’s and the early 2000’s approximately 22%
of the teachers in Texas public schools were men yet more than twice as many, 48%,
of the state’s public school principals were men.1 Joy (1998) using the Schools and
Staffing Survey of the National Center for Education Statistics from the late 1980’s
points out that as much as 86% of the teachers were female yet women comprised as
little as 22% of the principals. This paper aims to further investigate this difference.
That women are under-represented in the higher ranking positions is not a new
discovery. Olsen & Becker (1983) using the 1993-97 Quality of Employment Panel
conclude that women are held to higher standards than men and receive fewer pro-
motions. While studying lawyers, Spurr (1990) and Spurr & Sueyoshi (1994) find
that women are less likely than men to be promoted to partner after controlling for
differences in productivity. For those in academics, McDowell et. al. (1999 & 2001),
Ginther & Hayes (1999 & 2003), and Ward (2001) find similar results. Most recently,
Pekkarinen & Vartiainen (2006) argue that women face a higher promotion threshold
The journal model is American Economic Review.
1Based on the personnel records from the 1994-95 school year through the 2003-04
school year.
2than men in the Finnish metalworkers market. The number of studies on this subject
is daunting2 but the conclusions are the same: women are less likely to be promoted
than men.
Two main theories dominate the literature. While trying to explain the male-
female earnings gap, many point to discrimination in the promotion process against
women. The other explanation is that women have a comparative advantage in non-
market production thus face a higher opportunity cost and are more likely to quit. If
higher ranking professions within a firm require more firm-specific human capital ac-
cumulation, then the prediction that women are held to a higher promotion standard
than men is reached.3
These theories could also apply to men. Given the 1984 Supreme Court ruling
that women can pursue legal prosecution for promotion discrimination and the grow-
ing attraction in the United States to litigation as well as Affirmative Action4, men
could be the group that is out of favor. It is also feasible that men, having more labor
market opportunities outside of the education sector, have higher opportunity costs
and are more likely to quit, leading school districts to promote and invest in women
more often than men.5
In the context of education, tastes for jobs may also differ between the sexes.
Women could presumably get more satisfaction from working closely with children in
2Other studies include but are not limited to Johnson & Stafford (1974), Farber
(1977), Weiss & Lillard (1982), Laband & Lentz (1993), McCue (1996), Hersch & Vis-
cusi (1996), Jones & Makepeace (1996), Winter-Ebner & Zweimuller (1997), Pudney
& Shields (2000), Booth et al. (2003), and Mixon & Trevino (2005).
3See Lazear & Rosen (1990).
4See Holzer & Neumark (2000)
5Figures in the appendix illustrate various labor market opportunities for men
and women outside of education administration in Texas. The figures show that for
men and women principals in Texas public schools, mean and median earnings are
the same from 1995 through 2004. For managers outside of the education sector,
however, men earn more than women.
3the classroom and therefore would have a lower reservation wage for teaching than
for an administrative position. There is though no reason to believe that men do not
prefer the classroom.
The next chapter explores the promotion rates of men and women in Texas pub-
lic schools from 1994-95 until 2003-04, specifically promotion to school principal, an
administration position that requires certification prior to promotion. Given this re-
quirement, I control for career aspirations and measure the gender gap in promotion
to school principal. Joy (1998) uses a master’s degree as an indication that an indi-
vidual desires promotion to school administration. I use the principal certificate as
indication of desire for promotion. In a probit regression, I find ignoring differences
between the genders in desire for promotion yields results similar to the existing lit-
erature: men hold an advantage in the promotion process. However, restricting the
analysis to only those individuals who have expressed interest in an administrative
position, those who became trained and certified as a principal, I find men and women
face no statistically significant difference in the probability of promotion. Duration
analysis shows that although men are most often promoted four years after they be-
come certified and women are most often promoted six to seven years after becoming
certified, women face a much higher hazard of promotion than men. This cannot be
explained by a higher exit rate from the education sector by men.
Chapter III examines the effect of licensing and certification requirements for
public school administrators. Since licensing occurs most often in the rapidly grow-
ing service industry, the number of those impacted will only rise. Ideally, certification
and licensing regulation restricts entry from the lowest quality potential entrants,
those who do not meet the agreed upon minimum requirements.6 The quality dis-
6Restricting the supply of services can lead to higher earnings for individuals
in the profession. Stigler (1971) shows that licensed occupations earned more than
4tribution is effectively truncated thereby increasing the overall quality of the entrant
pool. In turn, the talented entrants will provide a higher quality of service in the
profession. Yet, high entry costs may cause the most talented individuals to seek
other employment and studies show mixed results on the effect of regulation on the
quality of received services. Kaine, Rockoff, and Staiger (2006) find certification sta-
tus has a small impact on student test performance. Kleiner and Kudrle (2000) as
well as Angrist and Guryan (2004) show that tougher licensing requirements do not
raise the quality of services provided whereas Carroll and Gaston (1981) suggest that
restrictive licensing may even lower received service quality.7 This suggests that ei-
ther licensing regulation doesn’t increase the quality of the entrant pool or that the
measures of quality used to certify and license individuals are poor predictors of high
quality output after entry. This paper aims to address the first issue and leaves the
latter for later discussion.
By studying school principals, I am able to identify the potential entrants into
the profession, i.e. teachers. Little consideration has been given to school principals.
The ability and performance of school administrators is important to the success of
our school children. Some suggest that although the quality of a teacher is difficult
to measure, the principal knows who the good teachers are. (These are proponents
of merit based pay for teachers.) Given that a principal’s job in part entails the
direction of the teachers, training principals to identify the talented teachers and use
that information for better development of the students is essential to improving our
public education.
unlicensed occupations. Recently, Angrist and Guryan (2004) find that teacher testing
increases teacher salaries.
7See Kleiner (2006) for a complete summary of the results of studies on the benefits
of occupational regulation.
5In 1999 and 2000, the Texas legislature enacted changes in the requirements
needed to become certified as a principal in Texas. These changes are two-fold.
Lifetime certification was abolished and alternative certification routes were opened.
Before this change, the traditional route to becoming a principal was through acad-
emic training at a college or university level as well as obtaining substantial teaching
experience. Now, less formal training is allowed and consideration of talent, ability,
and relevant experience is taken in the certification process. These changes have re-
lieved some of the barriers into school administration by introducing additional routes
of obtaining the required certificates.
I provide a description of the certification system and detail the changes in the
regulation in Texas. I also describe the differences between the traditional training
programs and the alternative programs to understand selection into each in order to
tease out answers to addressed questions. Using student test scores as a measure of
quality, I find evidence that lower entry costs brought about by a certification regime
change increase the quality of entrants into the principal profession. Two levels of
student test scores are aggregated. First, I use campus level student test scores to
measure the quality of individuals at each school. Then, I aggregate the scores by the
grade level and the subject of the exam as well as the campus at which the students
attend to measure the quality of the teachers. Test scores are also standardized in
several different ways to compare across time. Results are robust to the measurement
and standardization of the quality proxy, test scores.
With some concern about other unknown and unobserved factors that may have
changed at or near the time certification costs changed, I exploit a quasi-natural
experiment to further test the robustness of the results. Since the introduction of
alternative training and certification programs constitutes the main argument for re-
duced entry costs, I divide rural schools into treatment and control groups based on
6geography. If a school is within 100 miles of a new alternative training facility, an
individual working at that school is assumed to be treated by the regime change.
Individuals working at a school that is more than 100 miles from a new alternative
training facility compose the control group. Results agree with the other specifica-
tions. The reduction in certification costs brought about by the introduction of new
alternative training programs increases the probability of entry by a high quality
potential entrant.
Chapter IV explores the relationship between public school administrators’ com-
pensation and the level of school choice in an educational market. Charles Tiebout
(1956) proposes that, unlike government spending at the federal level, local expen-
diture levels are more or less set. Households choose the community in which they
reside within a reasonable market (based on their employment location) based on
matching their preferences for public goods expenditures to the expenditure patterns
of that local entity. The greater the number of local communities and the greater
the variation between them within a market, the closer the household will come to
a perfect match of its preferences. Since public school is financed at the school dis-
trict level, the Tiebout choice model is applicable. The effect of Tiebout choice on
schooling is directly relevant.
The studies of Tiebout choice and education are too numerous to list in full.
Epple and Romano (1998) develop a theoretical and computational model that al-
lows competition and choice through tuition-free public schools and tuition-financed
private schools. Evans and Schwab (1995) also examines the relationship between
private school and public school effectiveness. Stiglitz (1974), Ireland (1990), Eden
(1992), Manski (1992), Rothschild and White (1995), Epple and Romano (1995) and
Glomm and Ravikumar (1998) study choices in schooling by looking at the private
sector. Hoxby (1999) develops a principal-agent model for schooling producers.
7Hoxby (2000) attempts to measure the effects of Tiebout choice on student
achievement, per pupil spending and school productivity by controlling for poten-
tial endogeneity of the observed level of choice. She argues that the level of choice
observed in a school district is possibly affected by the productivity of that school
district. For example, within a schooling market (a metropolitan area in her study), a
school district that is successful for idiosyncratic reason will attract households with
school aged children (households with a high demand for school spending). Also,
other school districts will want to merge with the successful one to take advantage
of its talented administrators, thus reducing the level of choice in that market. To
address the endogeneity problem, she instruments the supply of jurisdictions with
data on streams, a natural boundary for school districts.
In the design of the empirical specification, Hoxby (2000) assumes that the level
of choice present in a given educational market has a positive effect on the reward
that the district gives its administrators who improve productivity. Since nothing is
observed on administrators’ incentives for productivity, she estimates a reduced form
of her specification where the level of Tiebout choice in the market has a direct effect
on the measures of output and productivity.
Using a reduced for model, Hoxby (2000) finds that OLS estimates, which do
not account for potential endogeneity bias, show no effect of school choice on either
student achievement, spending, or productivity. She also finds using an instrumental
variables approach that Tiebout choice raises school productivity. It does so by
increasing the level of student achievement while simultaneously decreasing the level
of per pupil spending. Also, where households have more choice, students are less
likely to attend private schooling.
This chapter examines the effect of increased school choice on the earnings and
abilities of school administrators. I use a rich dataset of personnel information for
8educators in the public schools in Texas and variation in the data across individuals
and across time allows for a clear identification of the effect. I find an overall pos-
itive effect of competition on administrators’ earnings suggesting that productivity
gains from hiring talented managers outweigh the pressure to reduce costs by cutting
salaries. However, the results are sensitive to the level of competition, the type of la-
bor market, and the administrators’ position. I control for possible endogeneity both
mechanically and with outside instruments and my conclusions largely unchanged.
9CHAPTER II
GENDER AND PROMOTION
A. Introduction
This chapter explores the promotion rates of men and women in Texas public schools
from 1994-95 until 2003-04, specifically promotion to school principal, an administra-
tion position that requires certification prior to promotion. Given this requirement,
I control for career aspirations and measure the gender gap in promotion to school
principal. Joy (1998) uses a master’s degree as an indication that an individual de-
sires promotion to school administration. I use the principal certificate as indication
of desire for promotion. In a probit regression, I find ignoring differences between
the genders in desire for promotion yields results similar to the existing literature:
men hold an advantage in the promotion process. However, restricting the analysis
to only those individuals who have expressed interest in an administrative position,
those who became trained and certified as a principal, I find men and women face no
statistically significant difference in the probability of promotion. Duration analysis
shows that although men are most often promoted four years after they become cer-
tified and women are most often promoted six to seven years after becoming certified,
women face a much higher hazard of promotion than men. This cannot be explained
by a higher exit rate from the education sector by men.
B. The Data
I utilize a set of data that was collected by the Texas Education Agency (TEA)
through their Public Education Information Management System (PEIMS). The TEA
is the statewide administrative unit that guides and oversees primary and secondary
10
public education in Texas. Data was collected on public school system personnel de-
mographics, education, gender, and other individual characteristics. The data avail-
able for this study cover the school years from 1994-95 to 2003-04.
In Texas, anyone who wants to pursue a career in administration must obtain
a principal certificate. Certificate information was provided by the State Board for
Educator Certification (SBEC). This data describes each certificate held, when the
certificate was acquired, the type of certificate, and the institution that granted the
certificate to each public school employee in the state.
In order to get an idea of the gender make-up in the data, I first present statistics
for each school year for teachers and principals in Table 1. The number of teachers
is increasing over this ten year period as is the number of male teachers. In fact, the
percentage of teachers that are male remains relatively constant at 22%. In contrast,
while the number of principals in Texas is increasing as the public school system
expanded over time, the number of principals who were men is noticeably decreasing.
In the 1994-95 school year there are 2,870 male principals yet in the latest year in the
available data there were only 2,544 male principals. The fraction of principals who
are male is therefore falling over this period not only because of the expanding school
system but also because of the falling number of male principals. The percentage of
principals in Texas fell from 54.2% in 1994-95 to only 42.3% in 2003-04.
Men are still over-represented as school principals, though. In the earlier years,
while only 22% of the teachers are men, over 50% of the principals are men. In the
later years, still 22% of the teachers yet around 42-44% of the principals are men.
This could be evidence of discrimination or it could reflect the fact that for various
reasons men enter the school principal market more than women. Men are often the
main provider of a household and thus pursue careers in administration for the higher
earnings. Women often choose education so they can have the same daytime schedule
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Table 1. Men in Texas Public Schools
School Year Teachers Principals
Number Men % Men Number Men % Men
1994-95 216,107 45,825 21.2% 5,297 2,870 54.2%
1995-96 228,803 50,153 21.9% 5,355 2,838 53.0%
1996-97 232,750 51,891 22.3% 5,430 2,758 50.8%
1997-98 241,960 53,766 22.2% 5,551 2,731 49.2%
1998-99 245,623 54,852 22.3% 5,551 2,644 47.6%
1999-00 254,179 56,272 22.1% 5,743 2,692 46.9%
2000-01 265,101 58,643 22.1% 5,895 2,707 45.9%
2001-02 272,234 60,523 22.2% 5,968 2,672 44.8%
2002-03 262,617 58,449 22.3% 6,008 2,592 43.1%
2003-04 264,153 58,942 22.3% 6,011 2,544 42.3%
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Table 2. Texas Public School Labor Market
Fraction Male
School Year Full Sample Master’s Certified
1994-95 23.9% 26.5% 46.8%
1995-96 24.6% 26.5% 45.9%
1996-97 24.4% 26.5% 44.6%
1997-98 24.2% 26.0% 43.7%
1998-99 24.3% 25.9% 42.5%
1999-00 24.2% 25.6% 42.0%
2000-01 24.0% 25.6% 41.3%
2001-02 24.1% 25.4% 40.5%
2002-03 24.0% 25.0% 39.5%
2003-04 23.9% 24.9% 38.8%
as their children. School administrators are required to work longer into the day and
over the summer. Thus, women may choose not to enter school administration until
their children are older. Table 2 shows for each school year the percentage of school
employees that are men in the full sample, those holding a master’s degree, and those
who are certified. The first column shows the percentage of men in the full sample.
The fraction remains nearly the same, about 24%, over the ten year period. The
other two columns show the percentage of those who obtained a master’s degree who
are men (often a measure associated with desire for promotion, see Joy (1998)) and
the percentage of those who hold a principal certificate. Men are decreasing in both
of these groups suggesting men are choosing this career path less often or women
are choosing this path more often. This could explain the reduction in the number
of male principals, however, I cannot identify the direction of causality here. Still,
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men are over-represented in the make-up of those who are certified. While around
24% of all full-time school employees are men, between 39 and 46% of those who are
certified are men suggesting that men do in fact enter administration at higher rates
than women.1
Table 3 describes the variables that I use in the analysis. In addition to gender
I use indicator variables for both educational attainment and race and/or ethnicity.
Each individual’s experience in Texas public schools is accounted for as well as their
certification status. Other variables are constructed from the data to control for
differences in supply and demand of principals. First, to measure differences in district
level demand for principals, I calculate the number of open principal positions in each
school district per 1,000 employees for each school year. To measure differences in
the supply of potential principals, I calculate the number of individuals in each school
district per 1,000 district employees for a given school year that are certified yet are not
employed as a principal. I also construct demand and supply for principals by labor
market, where a labor market is defined as the metropolitan or micropolitan statistical
area2 or the county for rural areas. Tables 4 and 5 summarize these variables.
Table 4 includes all full-time employees in Texas public schools that may be vying
for a principal position including teachers, counselors, athletic directors, assistant
principals, instructional officers, educational diagnosticians, teacher supervisors, and
principals. Again, the percentage of these employees that are male is 24%. Twenty-
nine percent hold a master’s degree and 1% had a doctorate. Ten and 19% of this
sample are African American and Hispanic, respectively. Asian Americans and Native
1If there is discrimination here it would have been through admissions into training
and certification programs. Unfortunately, I do not have data on admissions.
2As defined by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget (OMB). A metro area
contains a core urban area of 50,000 or more population, and a micro area contains
an urban core of at least 10,000 (but less than 50,000) population.
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Table 3. Variable Names and Descriptions
Variable Name Description
Male Equals 1 if the individual is a man; 0 of a woman.
Experience The number of years of teaching experience in the Texas
public school system.
Master’s Degree Equals 1 if the individual’s highest degree is a master’s
degree; 0 otherwise.
Doctorate Degree Equals 1 if the individual’s highest degree is a doctorate;
0 otherwise.
Black Equals 1 if the individual is African American; 0 other-
wise.
Hispanic Equals 1 if the individual is of Hispanic descent; 0 other-
wise.
Asian Equals 1 if the individual is Asian American; 0 otherwise.
Native American Equals 1 if the the individual is a Native American; 0
otherwise.
Open Positions The estimated demand for principals in the individual’s
school district or labor market for the given school year;
calculated for each district-year or market-year as the
number of principals employed in the district or market
that were not employed in the district or market as a prin-
cipal the previous year per 1,000 employees.
Number Certified The estimated supply of principals in the individual’s
school district or labor market for the given school year;
calculated as the number of certified individuals in a dis-
trict or market for that school year per 1,000 employees.
Age of Certification The number of calendar years since the individual ob-
tained principal certification for those who hold a certifi-
cate; equals 0 for if not certified.
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Table 4. Descriptive Statistics for the Full Sample
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min. Max.
Male 0.24 0.43 – –
Teaching Experience 12.1 9.6 0 64
Master’s Degree 0.29 0.45 – –
Doctorate Degree 0.01 0.09 – –
Black 0.10 0.29 – –
Hispanic 0.19 0.39 – –
Asian 0.006 0.080 – –
Native American 0.003 0.051 – –
Open Positions
District 4 7 0 333
Labor Market 4 3 0 118
Number Certified
District 70 20 7 571
Labor Market 69 11 0 286
Age of Certification 0.8 3.4 0 49
Notes: The sample consists of all full-time teachers, counselors, ath-
letic directors, assistant principals, instructional officers, educational
diagnosticians, teacher supervisors, and principals.
Americans represent less than 1% each of the full-time employees in Texas public
schools. On average, individuals in the full sample have 12.1 years of experience, face
8.3 open principal positions in their district, and work with 241 people who held a
principal certificate yet were not employed as a principal.
The full sample is not representative of those at risk for promotion to principal.
It includes individuals who may not desire promotion. Both women who want a
similar schedule as their children as well as men and women who would rather remain
in the classroom to work directly with the school children are included in the full
sample. Also, the full sample includes individuals who do not have the training
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Table 5. Descriptive Statistics for Certified Individuals
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min. Max.
Male 0.42 0.49 – –
Teaching Experience 20.0 8.6 0 64
Master’s Degree 0.86 0.35 – –
Doctorate Degree 0.05 0.22 – –
Black 0.13 0.33 – –
Hispanic 0.19 0.39 – –
Asian 0.002 0.050 – –
Native American 0.003 0.057 – –
Open Positions
District 4 7 0 333
Labor Market 4 3 0 118
Number Certified
District 74 22 7.4 571
Labor Market 70 11 0 286
Age of Certification 9.6 7.6 0 49
Notes: The sample consists of all full-time teachers, counselors, ath-
letic directors, assistant principals, instructional officers, educational
diagnosticians, teacher supervisors, and principals who hold a princi-
pal certificate.
and certification required to be a principal, regardless of career aspirations. For this
reason, I construct a second sample containing only those individuals who hold a
principal certificate (See Table 5). This sample more accurately reflects the group of
employees who have a chance for promotion to principal. Forty-two percent of this
sample are male. Individuals are more likely to have a post-graduate degree than in
the full sample. Eighty-six percent of the second sample hold a master’s degree while
5% hold a doctorate. More African Americans and fewer Asian Americans comprise
this group and on average individuals in this sample have 20 years of experience in
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the Texas public school system, face 4 open positions per 1,000 employees in their
district, and have 70 competitors per 1,000 employees for those positions in their
district. Also, individuals in this sample on average are certified to serve as principal
9.6 years prior to observation.
C. Estimation and Results
To investigate the differences in promotion rates between men and women and outline
differences in conclusions obtained when using the two different samples, Table 6
reports the results of probit regressions for the probability of promotion for the full
sample and the restricted sample. An indicator for an individual’s gender is included
in each model and is equal to 1 when male. Other variables that may influence
promotion decisions are included to control for differences between men and women.
These include the amount of experience in Texas public schools, education3, race and
ethnicity, the number of open positions for principal in the district and labor market,
the number of individuals who are certified in the district and labor market, and the
age of the certification if the individual is certified. Coefficient estimates are reported
in the first column, estimated marginal effects in the second column, and the standard
error is reported below each estimate.
The probit model, using the full sample, leads to a conclusion about male-female
promotion differences commonly found in the economics literature. Men are more
likely to be promoted than women and the estimated difference is statistically sig-
nificant. Here, results suggest that men have a 0.001 higher probability than women
to be promoted to principal controlling for observable differences in characteristics.
Although the magnitude of this result seems low, the overall probability of promotion
3Sicherman & Galor (1990) find that investment in human capital leads to higher
probabilities of occupational upgrading, within or across firms.
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Table 6. Probability of Being a Principal, Probit Regressions
Variable Full Sample Certified as a Principal
Coefficient Marginal Effect Coefficient Marginal Effect
Male 0.140*** 0.001*** -0.001 0.000
0.005 0.000 0.006 0.002
Teaching Experience -0.001*** 0.000*** 0.006*** 0.002***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Master’s Degree 1.032*** 0.021*** 0.264*** 0.068***
0.007 0.000 0.012 0.003
Doctorate Degree 0.901*** 0.030*** 0.117*** 0.034***
0.014 0.001 0.017 0.005
Black 0.029*** 0.000*** -0.092*** -0.025***
0.008 0.000 0.010 0.003
Hispanic 0.109*** 0.001*** 0.037*** 0.011
0.006 0.000 0.008 0.002
Asian -0.313*** -0.002*** -0.195** -0.050**
0.046 0.000 0.065 0.016
Native American 0.061 0.001 -0.046 -0.013
0.040 0.000 0.051 0.014
Open Positions 0.013*** 0.000*** 0.015*** 0.004***
0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
Number Certified -0.005*** 0.000*** -0.008*** -0.002***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Age of Certification
1 to 5 years old 1.865*** 0.095*** 0.988*** 0.302***
0.009 0.001 0.025 0.008
6 to 10 years old 2.320*** 0.198*** 1.536*** 0.510***
0.009 0.002 0.025 0.008
11 to 15 years old 2.338*** 0.205*** 1.615*** 0.549***
0.010 0.003 0.026 0.008
16 to 20 years old 2.232*** 0.179*** 1.560*** 0.542***
0.011 0.003 0.026 0.009
21 to 25 years old 2.096*** 0.149*** 1.476*** 0.526***
0.014 0.003 0.028 0.010
More than 25 years 1.830*** 0.096*** 1.289*** 0.464***
0.019 0.003 0.031 0.011
Notes: This table shows estimated probit models for the probability of promotion to
school principal. The Full Sample consists of 3,222,624 observations and the restricted
sample consists of 252,321 observations. An ’*’ indicates estimates significant at a
90% level; ’**’ indicates a 95% significance level; and ’***’ indicates a 99% significance
level.
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in this sample was only .017, thus men are about 6% more likely to be promoted to
principal.
The full sample does not capture the group of school employees that are at risk
of promotion. If men seek careers in administration more often than women, the
conclusion I find using the full sample may simply reflect that fact. As mentioned
before, the second sample contains only those individuals who are certified for the job.
The probit regression for this sample shows no statistically significant difference in
the likelihood of promotion to principal for men and women, controlling for individual
characteristics and differences in supply and demand of principals at the district or
labor market levels. This is consistent with the decline in male principals observed
in the data (Table 1). If men are initially over-represented, and men and women
are promoted at the same rate over the ten year period, then the number of male
principals must decline since women outnumber men in Texas schools.
As expected, experience and education aid a person’s promotion prospects. The
supply and demand of principals in the school district significantly influence pro-
motion rates as does the amount of time elapsed since certification was obtained.
African Americans and Asian Americans are promoted less often than whites while
there is no significant difference in the probability of promotion for Hispanics and
Native Americans compared to whites, controlling for other factors.
Probit regressions are a useful tool for an overall understanding of promotion
rates between men and women. However, most of the observations in the sample
are right censored. That is, there are individuals in the data that have not yet been
promoted to principal but may get promoted. The probit regressions ignore this
censoring.
To address the censoring in the data and to explore when in a person’s career
promotion is most likely to occur, I estimate a Cox proportional hazard model. The
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hazard of promotion is assumed to be
h(t) = h0(t)exp(β1x1 + β2x2 + . . .+ βkxk), (2.1)
where h0(t) is the baseline hazard of promotion after t years have passed since certi-
fication which is common to all individuals in the school system, x1, x2, . . . , xk are k
variables that affect the hazard of promotion proportionally over the entire time at
risk, and β1, β2, . . . , βk are the k model coefficients to be estimated.
Duration analysis generally is used to analyze time until an event occurs. In this
study, I analyze the time until a school employee is promoted to principal.4 Each
individual is considered at risk of promotion only when he or she becomes certified as
a school principal. Therefore, the time until promotion is measured in school years
since certification.
Table 7 reports the results of the estimated proportional hazard models. The
estimated hazard ratio is reported with its standard error below. The first column
reports the results of a proportional hazard model estimated with a pooled sample of
men and women, with an indicator for men and controls for other variables possibly
influencing promotion rates. The estimated hazard ratio for men is 0.863 and is statis-
tically significantly different from 1 at a 1% level suggesting that men, controlling for
other observed characteristics, face a hazard of promotion 13.7% lower than women.
Another interesting conclusion from the pooled hazard model is that Hispanics face a
hazard 19.8% greater than whites. Although no statistically significant difference ex-
ists between the promotion rates of whites and African Americans, Native Americans,
and Asian Americans, the magnitude of the results suggest African Americans face a
hazard of promotion 3.4% greater than whites, Asian Americans face a hazard rate
4The appendix shows that once promoted to principal, educators rarely return a
teaching position. Only about 1.5% of the principals each year return.
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Table 7. Time to Promotion to Principal
Variable Pooled Stratified Separate Models
Men Women
Male 0.863*** —– —– —–
0.024 —– —– —–
Teaching Experience 1.013* 1.015** 0.989 1.049***
0.007 0.007 0.010 0.011
Experience Squared 0.998*** 0.998*** 0.998*** 0.997***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Master’s Degree 0.660*** 0.662*** 0.666*** 0.691***
0.030 0.030 0.044 0.043
Doctorate Degree 0.304*** 0.298*** 0.213*** 0.406***
0.026 0.026 0.031 0.044
Black 1.034 1.031 1.209*** 0.960
0.045 0.045 0.086 0.053
Hispanic 1.198*** 1.198*** 1.068 1.294***
0.040 0.040 0.058 0.056
Asian 1.097 1.093 1.163 1.036
0.305 0.304 0.522 0.367
Native American 1.250 1.219 1.559 0.981
0.288 0.281 0.472 0.348
Open Positions 1.035*** 1.034*** 1.033*** 1.039***
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Number Certified 0.982*** 0.982*** 0.983*** 0.980***
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
Observations 172,366 172,366 70,383 101,983
Notes: The regressions fit a Cox proportional hazards model in which the dependant
variable is time until promotion to school principal measured in years after certifica-
tion. Standard errors appear under the estimated hazard ratios for each covariate.
Open Positions and Number Certified are measured as the number of individuals
per 1,000 school district employees. An ’*’ indicates estimates significant at a 90%
level; ’**’ indicates a 95% significance level; and ’***’ indicates a 99% significance
level.
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9.7% greater than whites, and Native Americans face a hazard rate 25% greater than
whites. The lack of statistically significant evidence may be due to few observations
in these groups.
The key assumptions in the proportional hazard model are that the effects of
the covariates on the baseline hazard is proportional over the range of analysis time.
In this study, the assumption is that men’s and women’s hazards differ by the same
proportion over time. This may not be true if women become certified at the same
time in their career as men, yet delay pursuit of a job as an administrator until their
children are older. To this end, I test the null hypothesis that men and women can
be combined in the same sample and the hazard rate of promotion for men relative
to women is constant. Using the Schoenfeld (1982) residuals approach, I reject the
null hypothesis that the hazard rate for men is proportional to the hazard rate for
women with a p-value less than 0.001.
I then use a stratified proportional hazard model where the underlying baseline
hazard function is allowed to differ between men and women, yet the effect of the
other variables are constrained to be the same for both sexes. That is, the hazard of
promotion is assumed to be
hi(t) = h0i(t)exp(β1x1 + β2x2 + . . .+ βkxk), (2.2)
for a subject in group i, where the two groups are men and women. The results of
this stratified model are presented in the second column of Table 7. The effect of
each covariate is similar to the estimated effects for the pooled sample, yet further
testing is warranted because the stratified model assumes each of the other factors
affecting the hazard of promotion are the same for men and women. Experience, for
example, may affect promotion in different ways for men and women if women often
leave the labor force for childbearing. Also, there may be great differences between
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the genders within a particular race. Therefore, I test the hypothesis that the other
factors of promotion shift men’s hazards and women’s hazards the same. I reject the
null hypothesis with a p-value less than 0.001 using a likelihood ratio test.5
In the final specification I estimate a proportional hazard model separately for
men and women. The last two columns of Table 7 report the results. Interestingly,
African American men face a hazard of promotion that is 22.2% larger than white men
and Hispanic women face a hazard of promotion 23.2% larger than white women.6
Experience affects the hazard of promotion differently for men and women. For both
men and women, obtaining a master’s or doctorate degree is associated with slower
promotion rates. Most of those who are certified, approximately 90%, eventually get
a master’s degree. In fact, those who do not have a master’s degree are near the
beginning of their administrative career, 1 to 5 years since obtaining certification.
Obtaining a doctorate takes longer. Less than 2% of those certified have a doctorate
within the first few years after becoming certified as a principal. Yet, over 8% of
those certified have a doctorate 18 years after becoming certified.7
A nice feature of the Cox proportional hazard model is that an estimate of the
hazard function is available. Figure 1 illustrates those hazard functions for white
men and women with a master’s degree, the typical individual in the data.8 The
most notable result illustrated in Figure 1 is that women have a higher hazard rate
5An auxiliary stratified model with interaction terms included is estimated where
the indicator for men is interacted with all of the other variables in the model to obtain
the full model for the likelihood ratio test. The nested model is the one presented in
the second column of Table 7.
6Among African American educators in Texas, 25% are men compared to 23%
male overall. Among Hispanic educators in Texas, only 71% are women, while 77%
of all educators are women.
7See tables in the appendix.
8The appendix provides 95% confidence bands for the hazard function of men and
women illustrated in Figure 1. Bootstrapping is used to calculate standard errors for
these estimates. The data is sampled 100 times with replacement.
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Fig. 1. Estimated Hazard Rate of Promotion to Principal, Evaluated for a White In-
dividual with a Master’s Degree
of promotion than men, with exception of the first few years after certification where
the hazards are nearly the same. This is a finding not normally reached for gender
differences in promotion rates. In fact, the hazard of promotion for women is double
that for men for some periods across the analysis time. Figure 2 shows the estimated
hazard rates for African American men and women with a master’s degree. Men and
women have similar hazard rates for the first four years with men having a slight
advantage. After four years, the hazard rates for African American women are larger
than for men. Figure 3 shows the hazard rates for Hispanic men and women with a
master’s degree. Hispanic women hold a definitive advantage over Hispanic men.
Another finding is that the shape of the hazard functions over time is similar
for both men and women, regardless of race. The hazard increases sharply for the
first few years after certification, peaks, and then declines. This may suggest that
at first, it takes a few years for employees and schools to find a match, but after
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Fig. 2. Estimated Hazard Rate of Promotion to Principal, Evaluated for Black Men
and Women with Master’s Degrees
a few years has passed, the chances for those not yet promoted decrease. 9 The
hazard function for men peaks earlier than for women, for whites, Hispanics, African
Americans. In fact, Figure 1 suggests that for white men, the period of time at which
promotion is most likely is about four years after certification. Men not yet promoted
after four or five years face ever declining prospects. The hazard rates for African
American and Hispanic men also peak at four years after certification. For women,
however, promotion is most likely six or seven years after certification, after which
rates sharply decline until ten years after certification where they remain relatively
unchanged thereafter. This is true regardless of race.
9This may also help explain the finding that holding an advanced degree is cor-
related with slower promotion. Since it takes time to receive an advanced degree,
especially a doctorate degree, and promotion occurs more often shortly after cer-
tification, holding a degree is negatively correlated with promotion. This does not
suggest, however, a causal relationship where an advanced degree somehow hurts your
chances of promotion.
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Fig. 3. Estimated Hazard Rate of Promotion to Principal, Evaluated for Hispanic Men
and Women with Master’s Degrees
D. The Hazard of Leaving Education
One explanation for the differences in promotion rates between men and women five
or more years after certification shown in Figure 1 is that men begin to leave public
education if not promoted whereas women stay and patiently take the principal jobs.
This may especially be true in urban areas where there are more opportunities outside
of education. I use the Cox proportional hazard model to examine the hazard of
leaving Texas public schools separately for men and women in both urban and rural
areas.10
10A competing risks model (CRM) with two events, leaving and promotion, was
also considered. The CRM was not used because while the baseline hazard function is
allowed to differ the effect of each covariate is assumed to be the same for both events.
That assumption is unacceptable because leaving education before promotion and
promotion to school principal are two opposing events. The effect of each covariate
is more likely the opposite for each event. More experience is expected to lead to
higher promotion rates but may lead to lower leave rates, for example. The CRM
also assumes that once an event occurs, it is possible that the other event could
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Fig. 4. Hazard of Leaving Texas Public Schools
I assume that if an individual is in the data one year and is not in the data
the next year and doesn’t reappear in the data for any subsequent year, that the
individual has left Texas public schools.11 If an individual leaves and reappears in
the data, he or she is considered a multiple failure. This could occur, for example, if
a woman leaves to have a child and then returns later, missing at least one full school
year.
Four models are estimated and Figure 4 shows the estimated hazard functions
occur afterward. This assumption is not defendable because once a person leaves
Texas public schools before getting promoted he or she cannot be promoted to school
principal. Also, once an individual is promoted to school principal, he or she cannot
leave before getting promoted.
11Recall the data is not a survey, but rather included comprehensive personnel
data.
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for urban men, rural men, urban women, and rural women.12 Like in Figure 1,
Figure 4 shows the estimated hazard function evaluated for white individuals holding
a master’s degree.13 Interestingly, men and women do appear to have different leave
rates, regardless of urban or rural status. Women, however, have a higher hazard of
leaving education before getting promoted than men. For both men and women, the
hazard rates are nearly the same for individuals living in urban and rural areas. There
is no sharp increase in the hazard of leaving four or five years after certification for
either urban or rural men that might account for the decline in promotion rates found
in Figure 1. Likewise, there is no sharp increase in the hazard of leaving for women
seven years after certification to explain the decrease in promotion rates shown in
Figure 1.
E. Conclusion
Over a ten year period from 1994 until 2004 the gender composition of teachers
and principals in Texas public schools suggests that men are over-represented in the
administrative ranks comprising 48% of the principals and only 22% of the teachers.
The number of principals, however, declines over this period. In this study I analyze
the promotion process for men and women to the position of school principal in Texas
public schools.
Since specific training and certification is required to serve as a principal in Texas,
I identify those individuals who desire advancement and are qualified for the job.
12Urban is defined as living in a metropolitan or micropolitan statistical area.
13Experience, the square of experience, indicators for a master’s and doctorate
degree, indicators variables for race and ethnicity, the number of open principal posi-
tions per 1,000 employees in the district, the number of certified individuals per 1,000
employees in the district, and an indicator equal to one if the individual is a principal
are included as covariates in the Cox proportional hazard models.
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Using a sample of employees from the state’s personnel files that includes individuals
certified as a principal, I show that there is no statistically significant difference in
the probability of promotion between men and women over this time period. When
using the full sample of employees, I find that men are more likely to be promoted but
point out that this conclusion is misleading because the sample does not accurately
reflect those at risk for promotion.
I further show using duration analysis that women in fact face a higher hazard
of promotion to principal than men in Texas public schools. Men face their highest
hazard of promotion four years after becoming certified. Women’s hazard rates peak
at six or seven years after certification. This result is consistent with Affirmative
Action for women as well as the theory that men face more opportunities outside of
education and are less committed to the education sector. Further analysis shows
however that men do not leave Texas public schools more frequently than women. In
fact, women are more likely to leave if they are not promoted.
Other conclusions have resulted from the empirical findings. African American
men face a hazard rate of promotion 22.2% larger than their observationally equivalent
white male counterparts. Also, Hispanic women face a hazard of promotion to school
principal 23.2% larger than white women. These findings are also consistent with
Affirmative Action but raises the question as to why African American women and
Hispanic men are not also given preference.
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CHAPTER III
OCCUPATIONAL REGULATION AND QUALITY
A. Introduction
This chapter examines the effect of restrictive licensing on the quality of the entrants
into a profession. Theory suggests that requiring minimum competency standards
truncates the low end of the quality distribution, however, increased costs of entry
encourage talented potential entrants to pursue outside opportunities. Using the
public school principal profession in Texas and measuring teacher quality by changes
in student achievement, I find evidence that lower entry costs increase the quality of
entrants. As a robustness check, I categorize observations geographically into control
and treatment groups to ensure the estimated effect is a result of reduced entry costs
and not unobserved factors.
By studying school principals, I am able to identify the potential entrants into
the profession, i.e. teachers. Little consideration has been given to school principals.
The ability and performance of school administrators is important to the success of
our school children. Some suggest that although the quality of a teacher is difficult
to measure, the principal knows who the good teachers are. (These are proponents
of merit based pay for teachers.) Given that a principal’s job in part entails the
direction of the teachers, training principals to identify the talented teachers and use
that information for better development of the students is essential to improving our
public education.
In 1999 and 2000, the Texas legislature enacted changes in the requirements
needed to become certified as a principal in Texas. These changes are two-fold.
Lifetime certification was abolished and alternative certification routes were opened.
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Before this change, the traditional route to becoming a principal was through acad-
emic training at a college or university level as well as obtaining substantial teaching
experience. Now, less formal training is allowed and consideration of talent, ability,
and relevant experience is taken in the certification process. These changes have re-
lieved some of the barriers into school administration by introducing additional routes
of obtaining the required certificates.
I provide a description of the certification system and detail the changes in the
regulation in Texas. I also describe the differences between the traditional training
programs and the alternative programs to understand selection into each in order to
tease out answers to addressed questions. Using student test scores as a measure of
quality, I find evidence that lower entry costs brought about by a certification regime
change increase the quality of entrants into the principal profession. Two levels of
student test scores are aggregated. First, I use campus level student test scores to
measure the quality of individuals at each school. Then, I aggregate the scores by the
grade level and the subject of the exam as well as the campus at which the students
attend to measure the quality of the teachers. Test scores are also standardized in
several different ways to compare across time. Results are robust to the measurement
and standardization of the quality proxy, test scores.
With some concern about other unknown and unobserved factors that may have
changed at or near the time certification costs changed, I exploit a quasi-natural
experiment to further test the robustness of the results. Since the introduction of
alternative training and certification programs constitutes the main argument for re-
duced entry costs, I divide rural schools into treatment and control groups based on
geography. If a school is within 100 miles of a new alternative training facility, an
individual working at that school is assumed to be treated by the regime change.
Individuals working at a school that is more than 100 miles from a new alternative
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training facility compose the control group. Results agree with the other specifica-
tions. The reduction in certification costs brought about by the introduction of new
alternative training programs increases the probability of entry by a high quality
potential entrant.
B. Institutional Framework
A typical career path for a public school administrator in Texas involves, after teach-
ing students in the classroom, several job titles with varying levels of authority. The
first promotion from teacher to administration is to either a teacher supervisor, an
instructional officer, or an educational diagnostician. The roles of these lower tier
administrators include instructional decision making, program planning and assess-
ment, supervision of small groups of personnel, and selection of appropriate curricula
for individual special needs students. The next progression in one’s career is advance-
ment to assistant principal1 and the final progression within the school is to principal.
The principal’s role in the school is to provide overall leadership and management
of all aspects of the education process within a campus. The principal must oversee
and facilitate the curricula and strategic plans that enhance teaching and learning,
manage the staff, resources, and financial resources of the campus, and apply organi-
zational, decision-making, and problem solving skills to ensure an effective learning
environment. I focus on the decision to become a principal and consider potential
entrants to be all individuals working in Texas public schools and not currently certi-
fied as a principal.2 A teacher enters the profession when he or she becomes certified
1There is a separate certification that is required to serve as an assistant princi-
pal. Holding a principal certificate does allow you, however, to serve as an assistant
principal.
2I do not include staff level employees such as teacher’s aides, custodians, cafeteria
workers, etc.
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as a principal.
The State Board for Educator Certification (SBEC) facilitates and monitors the
certification process. The SBEC was created to grant educators the authority to
govern their own profession. The Board is comprised of 14 members; four members
are teachers in public schools, two members are administrators, one school counselor,
four citizens not employed in public schools, and three non-voting members consisting
of a dean of education in Texas, a representative of the commissioner of education,
and a representative of the commissioner of higher education. The SBEC regulates
and oversees all aspects of certification in the state.3
In 1999 and 2000, significant changes to the certification process of principals
were adopted in Texas. In the old certification regime4, licensure was guaranteed
for life. In the new regime however, certificates must be renewed every five years by
participating in acceptable continuing education activities. The list of activities is
broad and unspecific5 and proof of completion is self reported6. Therefore, I assume
the renewal requirements in the new certification regime impose little or no additional
costs on the certificate holders.
3Kleiner (2000) points out that regulatory boards for licensed occupations gener-
ally control entry, enforce the standards of the practice, examine applicants’ creden-
tials, accredit schools and training facilities, and revoke a license when warranted.
Regulatory boards usually consist of members of the trade.
4The old certification regime is the period before September 1, 1999 and the new
certification regime is the period after September 1, 1999.
5The list of continuing education activities includes participation in institutes,
workshops, seminars, conferences, in-service or staff development, completion of un-
dergraduate courses, graduate courses, or training programs, participation in inter-
active distance learning, video conferences, or on-line activities, independent study,
development of curriculum, development of continuing professional education train-
ing materials, serving as an assessor, teaching or presenting a continuing education
activity, or providing professional guidance.
6The renewal process consists of a certified individual logging onto the SBEC
website, following the appropriate links for certificate renewal, and checking a box
attesting to having completed the required continuing professional activities. There
is a fee of $20 for renewal.
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The traditional training programs consisting of coursework and accumulated
semester hours are no longer the only means for evaluating candidates for certifi-
cation. Alternative training programs where preparation is based on the standards,
knowledge, and skills demonstrated by the candidate are now allowed by the SBEC.
The entity providing training determines how training is offered. However, the SBEC
requires the entity to develop and implement criteria that allow an individual to
substitute experience for part of the preparation program requirements.
All principals must have a master’s degree. The traditional training programs
always lead to a master’s degree whereas the alternative programs may or may not.7
If a teacher already holds a master’s degree before entry into a principal certification
program, he or she could pursue an alternative program which is cheaper, faster, and
usually held at night.8 If a potential principal does not hold a master’s degree, alter-
native programs leading to the required degree cost nearly the same as a traditional
program. The opportunity costs remain lower as alternative programs are designed
to be more accessible and courses are usually held at night. I therefore assume the
barrier costs to entry are reduced in the new certification regime.
Traditional university based programs have responded to the introduction of
alternative programs. Texas A&M University began offering classes in the evenings in
the late 1990’s on a limited bases. Night classes began around 2001, thereby allowing
teachers to remain in the classroom and become certified for school administration.
Thus, the new certification regime brings lower opportunity costs in traditional routes
7Online programs are available through the University of Phoenix, Walden, and
others. They are however quite expensive and lead only to graduate degrees and not
to certification as a principal.
8The actual costs of a traditional certification programs are between $7,000 and
$10,000 (based on 2005-2006 tuition rates) and require full-time enrollment in a two-
year graduate program at a college or university. Alternative training programs costs
approximately $4,000 and are completed after 18 months of evening and night classes.
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as well.
C. Occupational Choice
Traditional models of occupational choice assume the expected starting salary solely
influences the decision to enter training for that career. Zarkin (1985) develops a
model that treats career training much like investment in long-lived physical capital.
The forward looking model proves to be useful, at least in labor markets where future
demand conditions are easily forecasted. Hanushek and Pace (1995) investigate the
determinants of entering teacher training by combining data on individuals with state-
wide variation in certification requirements and show that certification requirements
do influence a person’s decision to study education. They find that teacher salaries
do not have as large an impact on one’s decision to enter the education field as does
certification requirements and a person’s gender, race, and ethnicity also play an
important role. Brewer (1996) studies the education profession while considering a
worker’s quit decision may be related to later career opportunities. Brewer illustrates
that a teacher’s decision to leave the sector is affected by the prospect and availability
of administration positions and the earnings in those positions. Most importantly,
Brewer finds that increases in the salary of administrators relative to teachers, in
the number of new administrators relative to teachers (a measure of administrator
turnover), and in the total number of administrators relative to teachers all reduce
the probability that a teacher quits.
Teachers decide whether to acquire the additional training required to enter the
administrative side of the education labor market. In fact, a teacher decides between
two alternatives: remain a teacher (k=0), or enter administration training (k=1).9
9A teacher could also leave the education sector completely in search of outside
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Assume teachers are risk-neutral and form rational expectations. Then, the expected
lifetime utility from working in the classroom for individual i, employed by school
district d, at time t is
U cidt = Et
 Ti∑
t=1
βtuidt(w
c
idt, r
c
idt)
 , (3.1)
where uidt is the utility from the monetary rewards, w
c
idt, and non-monetary rewards,
rcidt , of teaching in the classroom. Ti is the expected number of years remaining
until individual i retires. β is a discount factor ( 0 < β < 1 ), and E denotes the
expectations operator.
The expected lifetime utility from working in school administration is
Uaidt = Et
 Ti∑
t=1
βtuidt(w
a
idt, r
a
idt)
 , (3.2)
where uidt is the utility from the monetary rewards, w
a
idt, and non-monetary rewards,
raidt, of administration work.
In each period, a teacher makes the decision to remain in the classroom or to
obtain certification and enter administration. Since promotion to principal is not
guaranteed upon completion of the training and certification process, an individual’s
expected lifetime utility from entering the administration profession is
Vidt = ρidtU
a
idt + (1− ρidt)U cidt (3.3)
where ρidt is the probability individual i is promoted in school district d in year t,
once certified.10 Teachers compare the expected present value of lifetime utility from
opportunities. See the appendix for exit rates from Texas public schools. Teachers
are most likely to leave the education sector within the first five years. The average
experience, however, for an individual with a principal certificate is about 20 years.
Therefore, the exit decision and the decision to obtain principal certification occur at
different points in ones career.
10I assume that teachers once certified remain employed in the same school district.
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the two career paths within education when deciding if they will enter into principal
training. Let y∗idt be the net gain from entering administration. Thus,
y∗idt = (Vidt − Ct)− U cidt, (3.4)
where Ct is the total cost, including opportunity cost, of attending a school principal
training and certification program. Using equations (3.3) and (3.4),
y∗idt = ρidt(U
a
idt − U cidt)− Ct (3.5)
where ρidt(U
a
idt − U cidt) is the expected return of a principal certificate and Ct is the
cost of obtaining the certificate.
Assume individual tastes and preferences, uidt, are captured by a matrix of indi-
vidual characteristics, Xidt, and a matrix of school district characteristics, Zdt. Also,
utility is additively separable in the following way:
U cidt ≡ U cidt(Ti, wcidt, Xidt, Zdt) ≈ ν(wcidt) + rcidt(Ti, Xidt, Zdt), (3.6)
and
Uaidt ≡ Uaidt(Ti, waidt, Xidt, Zdt) ≈ ν(waidt) + raidt(Ti, Xidt, Zdt). (3.7)
Using equations (3.6) and (3.7), equation (3.5) becomes
y∗idt = ρdt [ν(w
a
idt − wcidt) + raidt(Ti, Xidt, Zdt)− rcidt(Ti, Xidt, Zdt)]− Ct, (3.8)
where ν(waidt−wcidt) is the utility gained from an increase in earnings associated with
Evidence shows that as much as 85% of teachers who obtain a principal certificate
remain in the school district in which they taught. See the appendix for a detailed
description of post-certification mobility rates.
38
a promotion from teacher to principal. The increase or decrease in non-wage rewards
associated with a position in administration relative to teaching is [raidt − rcidt].
A certified individual i is chosen for promotion in district d in year t based on the
available administration openings in the district as well as observable characteristics
of the individual. The number of available positions in a district at a given time
depends on administrator turnover. Let Ndt be the number of new or otherwise open
principal jobs in school district d in year t. The likelihood of promotion once certified
depends also on the number of competitors in the market, i.e. the number of others in
the district that are certified for as a principal, yet have not been promoted. Denote
Mdt as that sum. It follows then that
ρidt = ρ(Ndt,Mdt, Xidt, Zdt). (3.9)
Using equations (3.8) and (3.9), assume the reduced form equation for the net
gain of a principal certificate is
y∗idt = h(Ct, ρ(Ndt,Mdt, Xidt, Zdt), ν(w
a
idt − wcidt), Xidt, Zdt) + εidt (3.10)
where εidt are assumed to follow a normal distribution. In order to estimate equation
(3.10), in addition to data on certification costs, individual characteristics, and district
characteristics, I need an estimate for each individual, district, and time period for the
probability of promotion, ρ(Ndt,Mdt, Xidt, Zdt), and the wage premium, ν(w
a
idt−wcidt).
D. Data
This study utilizes a rich set of data that is collected by the Texas Education Agency
(TEA) through their Public Education Information Management System (PEIMS).
The TEA is the statewide administrative unit that guides and oversees primary and
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Fig. 5. Number of New Certificates Each Year, Mid-Management and Principal Cer-
tificates
secondary public education in Texas. Data is collected on public school system per-
sonnel salaries, demographics, education, gender, and other individual characteristics.
Campus and district enrollment and student test scores are also available. In addition,
certificate information is provided by the SBEC. This data describes each certificate
held, when the certificate was acquired, the type of certificate, and the institution
that granted the certificate to each public school employee in the state. Focus is
placed on the certificate required to serve as school principal.
1. Descriptive Statistics
Figure 5 shows the total number of new principal certificates over time from the SBEC
certificate data. There is a spike in the number of new certificates just before the new
regime and a corresponding drop the following year. Likely, those individuals planning
to attend a training program entered earlier in anticipation of lifetime certification
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Table 8. Descriptive Statistics by Certification Status
Variable Certified Not Certified T-stat
Experience 20.1 11.4 478.7
Male 42.3% 22.6% 194.3
Hispanic 19.0% 19.2% -2.1
African American 12.7% 9.2% 50.9
Asian American 0.2% 0.7% -37.8
Native American 0.3% 0.3% 6.6
Bachelors 8.6% 65.4% -905.8
Masters 85.9% 24.2% 836.2
Doctorate 4.9% 0.5% 100.8
N 250,988 2,926,787
Notes: The first column of the table shows the mean values of the
variables for principal certificate holders, regardless of their job title.
The second column shows the same statistics for teachers, counselors,
assistant principals, athletic directors, teacher supervisors, and edu-
cational diagnostician who are not certified to work as a principal in
Texas. The third column gives the t-statistic for the difference be-
tween the two means. Data reflects school years 1994-1995 through
2003-2004.
abolishment. In the years to follow, the flow of new principals adjusts and a gradual
upward trend continues. This shows a reaction to the legislation, however, nothing
about the quality of the newly certified is revealed.
Table 8 compares the characteristics of entrants and those who have not entered
the principal profession. The first column, labeled Certified, summarizes the char-
acteristics of those who hold a principal certificate. In contrast, the second column,
titled Not Certified, shows those not certified as a school principal. Notice certified
individuals have more experience than those who are not certified. The average ex-
perience for certified and non-certified employees is 20.1 and 11.4 years, respectively.
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The fraction of males in administration (42.3%) is much larger than the fraction not in
administration (22.6%) over the observed time period. African Americans represent
12.7% of those certified and 9.2% of those not. Hispanics are not under-represented
in administration, representing about 19% of those certified and those not certified as
a school principal. The difference in educational attainment between those certified
and those not is unsurprising. Principal certificate holders are more likely to have a
master’s degree or doctorate and less likely to hold only a bachelor’s degree at the
time of certification.11
The new legislative regime introduced alternative training programs. Table 9
shows the number of new certificates issued in the two relevant certification regimes
by the type of program attended. In the old certification regime (from school year
1994-1995) 9,661 new principals were certified. In the new certification regime (from
school year 1999-2000 until 2003-2004) both traditional training programs and alter-
native programs were available. In this regime 10,409 individuals were certified using
the traditional route and 647 were certified after attending an alternative training
program.12 Notice that the number of individuals attending traditional programs
doesn’t decrease after alternative programs were introduced. Instead attendance of
11In fact, individuals receive a master’s degree at the time of certification. Table 8
shows 8.6% of those who are certified have only a bachelor’s degree. Two things are
causing this statistic. One, there are individuals in the data who were certified as a
principal in the 1960’s and 1970’s when a master’s degree was not required. Also, there
are observations where the current year and the year of certification are the same.
There are clearly timing issues with these observations regarding the master’s degree.
Either the degree was issued later than the certification or more likely, information
about the individual’s degree was not updated in the PEIMS data until the next
school year.
12There are 30 alternative training programs in the data. All of these programs
began issuing certificates in 2000 and 2001. The only exception if 21st Century
Leadership which first appears in the data issuing a certificate in 2004. Only one
individual, however, has been certified by this program. Thus, all of these programs
opened just after the regime change.
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Table 9. Type of Certificate
Year Traditional Alternative Share
Old Certification Regime
1995 1,753 —– —–
1996 1,682 —– —–
1997 1,797 —– —–
1998 1,845 —– —–
1999 2,592 —– —–
New Certification Regime
2000 1,565 85 5.2%
2001 1,819 96 5.0%
2002 2,124 138 6.1%
2003 2,194 160 6.8%
2004 2,405 161 6.3%
Notes: This table shows the number of new principal certificates is-
sued in each certification regime by the type of program attended.
Traditional refers to the standard university or college based princi-
pal training program whereas Alternative programs are more flexible
and often require less time for completion. The share illustrated in
the third row is the fraction of all certifications that are generated
from an alternative training program.
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both types of programs increases in the new certification regime.
2. Estimating the Wage Premium
In order to estimate equation (3.10), I need to first estimate the wage premium each
individual faces. Earnings are observed in the PEIMS data. For principals, wa, and
for teachers, classroom earnings, wc, are easily identified in the data. The wage
premium, WP ≡ (wa − wc), affects an individual’s decision to enter the principal
market. Since wa is not observed for teachers and wc is not observed for principals, I
estimate the wage premium for each individual in each school district over time using
a switching regressions framework.
Let w be an individual’s wage and let A indicate whether the individual is an
administrator or a teacher.13 An individual’s wage can be expressed as
w = (1− A)wc + Awa = wc + (wa − wc)A. (3.11)
The variable of interest is the wage premium, WP , and is a random variable that
is specific to each individual. If each individual were randomly assigned a position
within the school district to either teacher or administrator, then the wage premium
is simply WP = E(wa − wc). However, promotion to administrator is not random.
So, assuming that promotion is based on observed characteristics, X, the conditional
wage premiums are of interest, WP = E(wa − wc | X).
It is useful at this point to decompose the outcomes into mean and stochastic
parts,
wa = µa + ηa, where E(ηa) = 0, (3.12)
13A is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the individual is a principal and equal to
zero if a teacher.
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and
wc = µc + ηc, where E(ηc) = 0, (3.13)
which gives the switching regressions model,
w = µc + (µa − µc)A+ ηc + A(ηa − ηc), (3.14)
and thus
E(w | A,X) = µc + αA+ gc(X) + A[ga(X)− gc(X)], (3.15)
where α = WP (X), ga(X) = E(η
a | X), and gc(X) = E(ηc | X). The wage therefore
can be modeled using a function of A, X, and the interaction of A and X. Assuming
gc and ga are linear in the parameters,
E(w | A,X) = µc + αA+Xβ + A[X − E(X)]δ, (3.16)
where β and δ are vectors of unknown parameters.14 Using a regression of an in-
dividual’s wage on a constant, an indicator for principal, Aidt, a set of individual
characteristics used in determining promotion, Xidt, and the interaction between the
two, Aidt(Xidt−X) I estimate the wage premium as αˆ, the coefficient on Aidt. I calcu-
late the wage premium for different groups using the characteristics, X, and therefore
the wage premium that individual i employed in school district d at time t faces is
̂WP (Xidt) = αˆ+ (Xidt −X)δˆ. (3.17)
Using equation (3.17), I impute the wage premium that each individual faces
within their own school district, given their characteristics. I calculate the wage
14Subtracting E(X) ensures that α, the coefficient on A, is the average treatment
effect on earnings, or here, the wage premium, WP. See Wooldridge (2002).
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premium using differences in the natural log of annual earnings for each individual.
Thus, the imputed wage premium is measured as the log of the ratio of administrator
earnings to classroom earnings. The average wage premium in Texas, α̂, is 1.52,
suggesting that in Texas principals earn 52% more than teachers on average. The
wage premium increases if an individual obtains a higher degree or is older. Men face
a higher wage premium than women. 64.9% of the variation in earnings is explained
by the model.
3. Estimating the Probability of Promotion
Someone considering principal training who believes it highly probable he or she
will be promoted to principal after obtaining the certificate is more likely to enter
than someone who believes promotion will never be realized. To that end, I impute
a measure of the expected probability of promotion after certification. Promotion
within a school district not only depends on the need for new administrators due to
turnover or expansion, but also individual characteristics. For example, a teacher
with a graduate degree is more attractive than one without. Also, men may be more
or less likely to get promoted than women. A person’s experience, I propose, is related
to probability of promotion. Near the beginning of one’s career, promotion is unlikely.
With more experience an individual becomes more likely to get promoted. Yet, near
the end of a career, promotion remains unlikely because of a shorter expected time
until retirement.
Using the subset of observations that are certified as a principal, I estimate a
probit model of the probability of promotion once certified on the number of open
positions in the school district, the number of available certified individuals15 in the
15Those who are certified as a principal, but not currently employed as a principal.
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Table 10. Predicted Probability of Promotion
Variable Prob. of Promotion
All Employees
Average 14.3%
Minimum 3.5%
Maximum 66.5%
Certified Employees
Average 21.4%
Minimum 3.5%
Maximum 66.5%
Notes: The table shows statistics on the predicted proba-
bility of promotion to school principal. Data covers school
years 1994-1995 through 2003-2004 in Texas.
school district, and individual characteristics. I predict, for all observations regardless
of certification status, the probability of promotion for each individual to use as a
measure of the expected probability of promotion if the individual becomes certified.
The assumption is that someone who is deciding whether or not they should incur
the costs associated with obtaining a principal certificate will consider how likely it
is they will get promoted to principal once they are certified. They will look at those
around them who are certified to estimate the likelihood of promotion. Therefore, I
impute the probability of promotion based on the individuals who are certified only.
I then use the estimated model to predict the expected probability of promotion for
all individuals in the data to capture their perception of the likelihood of promotion.
Results of the estimated probability of promotion model can be found in the appen-
dix. Table 10 shows the average predicted probability of promotion if certified is
14.3%. The lowest predicted probability of promotion and the highest are 3.5% and
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66.5%, respectively. For those who are certified, the average predicted probability of
promotion is 21.4%.
4. Teacher Quality
I measure teacher quality using changes in student achievement. First, teachers are
matched to student scores on the Texas Assessment of Academic Skills (TAAS) at
the campus level.16 Matching a teacher to the student in his or her class is optimal.
However, this data does not provide that link. Each student is first matched to the
school that he or she attended and in turn, each teacher is matched to the average of
the student scores at the school where he or she taught.
Test scores are available for fourth through eight grades and tenth grade. Two
exams, one measuring reading skills and one for math, are given to the students.
Although most of the data used in the analysis covers school years from 1994-1995
through 2003-2004, student scores are only available from 1995-1996 through 2001-
2002. This could constrain identification of a certification regime effect on the entry
decisions of future principals.
Since the tests themselves can vary over time, I standardize the scores. Following
Kirby et al. (2002), I first rank the schools’ average student scores for each year.
Next, I compute the percentiles of distribution of ranks by dividing each rank by
16The students’ Texas Learning Index, or TLI, score on the TAAS is used. The
TLI is a score that describes how far a student’s performance is above or below the
passing standard. The passing standard, for example, for Grades 3 through 8 is a
TLI of 70. The TLI is not the percentage of questions correctly answered. A student
may have answered all questions correctly on both the math and reading tests for
5th grade, for example, and receive a TLI score of 93 on the math exam and 100 on
the reading exam. The TLI is therefore comparable across grade levels. If a student
scores that same for two consecutive grade levels, then he or she has made typical
progress from the one grade level to the other. If the student’s score increased, then
he or she progressed more than the typical student. If the student’s score decreased,
then he or she did not achieve the typical one year’s learning progress.
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the total number of schools. Finally, I standardize the percentiles for each school by
computing z-scores. Changes in the rank based z-score from one school year to the
following school year are linked to teachers. These rank based z-scores have a nice
property. A teacher who increases low performing students’ scores a distance of y,
has a higher z-score than a teacher who takes average students the same distance.
Also, a teacher who improves a high performing group of students’ scores y units has
a higher z-score than a teacher who increases average students’ scores by y.
The second level of teacher to students matching is at the grade and subject
level. Using information on the subject that each teacher taught combined with the
different subjects and grade levels for TAAS exams, I link teachers more closely to the
students they taught.17 I again use changes in rank based z-scores but I also consider
the percentile rank and the traditional z-score for robustness.
E. Estimation and Results
To examine the effect of certification requirements on an individual’s decision to
enter the principal profession, I estimate equation (3.10).18 To capture the reduction
17Using the service description for each individual, a grade level and a subject
is assigned for 4th through 8th grade reading and math teachers. Teachers could
service more than one subject-grade group in a given school year thus the fraction of
their time spent servicing each group is considered. To calculate student performance
measures for each subject-grade group, campus level math and reading TAAS scores
are matched to teachers’ service groups. The result is a teacher to student match
at the campus, grade, and subject level. For example, a sixth grade math teacher
is linked to the average of all sixth grade students’ scores on the sixth grade math
TAAS exam in that school. This matching is likely better for middle school teachers
than elementary teachers as students at those campuses meet with several teachers
each day for different subjects instead of seeing only one teacher all day.
18Murphy and Topel (1985) point out that imputed unobserved regressors from
auxiliary econometric models fail to account for the fact that the imputed regressors
are measured with sampling error. Thus, hypothesis tests based on the estimated
covariance matrix for this regression equation are biased. However, Murphy-Topel
estimates of the standard errors for each probit model can be found in the appendix.
No conclusions are altered using the Murphy-Topel standard errors.
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Table 11. Principal Entry and Education, Models 1 and 2
Model 1 Model 2
Variable Estimate St. Error Estimate St. Error
New Regime 0.036*** 0.001 0.035*** 0.001
Bachelors Degree 0.028*** 0.001 0.037*** 0.001
[Bach.]*[New Regime] -0.025*** 0.001 -0.024*** 0.001
Masters Degree 0.255*** 0.006 0.420*** 0.007
[Mast.]*[New Regime] -0.021*** 0.001 -0.020*** 0.001
Doctorate 0.648*** 0.011 0.901*** 0.005
[Doc.]*[New Regime] -0.019*** 0.000 -0.018*** 0.000
Male 0.019*** 0.000 0.036*** 0.001
Experience -0.002*** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000
Wage Premium 0.009*** 0.003 0.177*** 0.004
Prob. of Promotion 1.462*** 0.006 1.642*** 0.008
Ethnicity Controls No Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes
Bachelors Degree 100.0% 99.0%
Masters Degree 6.4% 6.4%
Doctorate 3.8% 3.9%
Notes: The top panel in the table shows estimated marginal effects from probit regres-
sions where the dependant variable is the probability of entering the principal profes-
sion. Data covers school years 1994-1995 through 2003-2004 in Texas. NewRegime is
an indicator variable equal to 1 after new alternative certification was introduced. Ed-
ucation measures are indicator variables for the highest degree attained. Experience
is the total number of years experience in public education in Texas. An ’*’ indicates
estimates significant at a 90% level; ’**’ indicates a 95% significance level; and ’***’
indicates a 99% significance level. The lower panel in the table shows the conditional
effects of the certification regime change on the probability of entering the principal
profession for those with different education levels expressed as a percentage change.
The average probability of entry for holders of a bachelors degree, masters degree,
and doctorate are 0.011, 0.233, and 0.442, respectively.
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Table 12. Principal Entry and Education, Models 3 and 4
Model 3 Model 4
Variable Estimate St. Error Estimate St. Error
New Regime 0.035*** 0.001 0.034*** 0.001
Bachelors Degree 0.024*** 0.001 0.031*** 0.001
[Bach.]*[New Regime] -0.024*** 0.001 -0.023*** 0.001
Masters Degree 0.313*** 0.006 0.449*** 0.007
[Mast.]*[New Regime] -0.020*** 0.001 -0.019*** 0.000
Doctorate 0.824*** 0.007 0.945*** 0.003
[Doc.]*[New Regime] -0.018*** 0.000 -0.016*** 0.000
Male 0.035*** 0.000 0.049*** 0.000
Exp. 6-10 0.027*** 0.000 0.034*** 0.001
Exp. 11-15 0.020*** 0.001 0.033*** 0.001
Exp. 16-20 0.010*** 0.001 0.025*** 0.001
Exp. 20+ -0.005*** 0.000 0.008*** 0.001
Wage Premium 0.160*** 0.002 0.266*** 0.002
Prob. of Promotion 1.356*** 0.007 1.518*** 0.008
Ethnicity Controls No Yes
Year Dummies Yes Yes
Bachelors Degree 100.5% 99.2%
Masters Degree 6.6% 6.5%
Doctorate 4.0% 3.9%
Notes: See notes Table 11. Exp.6− 10 is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the indi-
vidual has between 6 and 10 years of experience. Exp.11− 15 is an indicator variable
equal to 1 if an individual has between 11 and 15 years of experience. Exp.16 − 20
is an indicator variable equal to 1 if an individual has between 16 and 20 years of
experience. Exp.20+ is an indicator variable equal to one if an individual has more
than 20 years of experience. Beginning teachers with 5 or fewer years of education is
the omitted comparison group.
51
in certification costs resulting from the legislation change in Texas, I construct an
indicator, NewRegime, equal to one in periods where the new certification regime is
in effect.19
Tables 11 and 12 show results of estimating the model using educational attain-
ment as a proxy for individual quality. Measures of education are interacted with the
regime change indicator variable to allow the effect of quality on the teacher’s deci-
sion to enter administration to differ between the two certification regimes. Model
1 controls also for the individual’s sex, experience, expected increase in earnings af-
ter hired as a principal (wage premium), probability of promotion, and school year.
Teachers with a bachelor’s degree are 2.5 percentage points more likely to enter the
principal profession in the new regime. Since entry by a teacher with only a bachelors
degree is not highly probable, this represents a 100.0% increase in entry by this group.
Teachers with a master’s degree are 6.4% more likely to train to be a principal after
the costs are reduced. For those with a doctorate, the regime change increases entry
by 3.8%. The reduction in entry costs had a larger effect on those with less education.
The estimation also shows that men are 1.9 percentage points more likely to enter
administration than females. This is a large difference as the estimated probability
that the average teacher enters administration is less than nine percent. More experi-
enced teachers are somewhat less likely to become principals according to the results
from estimating Model 1. This is an unexpected result that may change with more
flexible model specifications.
Models 2, 3, and 4 include controls for different variables that may influence a
teacher’s decision to become a principal. Model 2 introduces controls for ethnicity.
19Although I assume that the new certification requirements represent lower costs
of entry, one may also view this analysis as the effect of a change in legislation. Con-
clusions could then be framed as effects of the legislation change instead of responses
to reduced entry costs.
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Though magnitudes of the estimated effects change by a small amount, conclusions
remain mainly the same. Teacher’s with a bachelor’s degree, master’s degree, and
doctorate are 99.0%, 6.4%, and 3.9% more likely to enter school administration after
the certification costs are reduced through legislation, respectively. Models 3 and 4
allow for discontinuities in the effect of experience on principal entry. Experience
groups are constructed for teachers with 6 to 10 years of experience, 11 to 15 years of
experience, 16 to 20 years of experience, and more than 20 years of experience. Begin-
ning teachers with 5 or fewer years of experience are the comparison group. Results
generally show that more experienced teachers are more likely to enter. However,
the size of this effect decreases with more experience. In fact, Model 1 predicts that
teachers with more than 20 years of experience are less likely to enter the principal
profession than teachers with 5 or fewer years of experience. This is not unexpected.
Those with more than 20 years of experience are closer to retirement and have less
time to recoup the costs of obtaining the principal certificate.
Like Models 1 and 2, Models 3 and 4 produce similar effects for each education
level. Model 3 estimates that teachers with a bachelor’s degree, master’s degree, and
doctorate are 100.5%, 6.6%, and 4.0% more likely to enter when costs are reduced,
respectively. Model 4 finds that those with a bachelor’s degree, master’s degree, and
doctorate are 99.2%, 6.5%, and 3.9% more likely to enter under the new regime, re-
spectively. All are conclusions that suggest reducing the costs of entry have attracted
those with less education.
Each of the four models presented have similar conclusions about the effect of the
expected wage premium and probability of promotion. With the exception of Model 1,
the models show that a 1% increase in the wage premium an individual faces leads to
a 16.0 to 26.6 percentage point increase in the probability of entering administration.
Also, the expected probability of promotion has a large effect on entry. A teacher in
53
the top of the distribution who believes he or she has a 50% chance of promotion if
certified is 65.7% more likely to attain certification than a teacher in the bottom of
the distribution who believes he or she has only a 10% chance of promotion.20
Using the change in student test scores as a proxy for teacher quality, Tables 13
and 14 shows a selected portion of the estimation results for twelve test score mea-
sures.21 The change in average TAAS scores are included in the model and interacted
with the indicator for the NewRegime. Assuming a teacher associated with higher
student test score improvements is a teacher of higher quality, a positive estimated
marginal effect for the interaction term between TestScore and NewRegime suggests
that reducing entry costs attracts high quality teachers to the principal profession
more so than low quality teachers. A negative estimated effect would suggest the
opposite.
Estimating the entry model using each grade level and subject test separately
yields evidence supporting increased high quality teacher entry. Most estimations
result in a positive estimated coefficient on the interaction term between the change
in the test score and the regime change indicator and many are statistically signifi-
cant. The only exceptions are the results of the regressions using tenth grade scores
where the estimated quality effect of the certification regime change is negative and
significant in one of the two regressions.
The lower grades, forth, fifth, and sixth, show much stronger results than the
higher grades. Teachers are matched to all the students in the school for these re-
gressions, regardless of the subject or grade level they teach. This creates some
measurement error in the quality measure, the change in test scores, however, it is
20Statement uses the estimate results of Model 2 in Table 11.
21Reading and math scores for six different grade-levels are used. One each for
forth grade, fifth grade, sixth grade, seventh grade, eighth grade, and tenth grade.
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Table 13. Principal Entry and Student Test Scores, Grades 4, 5, 6, and 7
4th Grade 5th Grade
Variable Math Read Math Read
New Regime 0.0010*** 0.0016*** 0.0016*** 0.0016***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
∆ Score -0.0005*** -0.0004*** -0.0003** -0.0004***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
[∆ Score]*[New Regime] 0.0011*** 0.0012*** 0.0009*** 0.0009***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
6th Grade 7th Grade
Math Read Math Read
New Regime 0.0002 0.0002 0.0016*** 0.0004
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004)
∆ Score -0.0005** -0.0004 0.0002 -0.0002
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003)
[∆ Score]*[New Regime] 0.0019*** 0.0011*** 0.0000 0.0005
(0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Notes: The table shows estimated marginal effects of probit regressions where the
dependant variable is the probability of entering the principal profession. Regressions
include controls for gender, education, experience, wage premium, the probability of
promotion, and trends over time. Test scores are standardized using the rank based z-
score method. Standard errors are shown in (·). An ’*’ indicates estimates significant
at a 90% level; ’**’ indicates a 95% significance level; and ’***’ indicates a 99%
significance level. Data covers school years 1995-1996 through 2001-2002 in Texas.
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Table 14. Principal Entry and Student Test Scores, Grades 8 and 10
8th Grade 10th Grade
Math Read Math Read
New Regime 0.0016*** 0.0004 0.0001 0.0026***
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
∆ Score -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0009*** 0.0004
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004)
[∆ Score]*[New Regime] 0.0009* 0.0001 -0.0011** -0.0001
(0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005)
Notes: The table shows estimated marginal effects of probit regressions where the
dependant variable is the probability of entering the principal profession. Regressions
include controls for gender, education, experience, wage premium, the probability of
promotion, and trends over time. Test scores are standardized using the rank based z-
score method. Standard errors are shown in (·). An ’*’ indicates estimates significant
at a 90% level; ’**’ indicates a 95% significance level; and ’***’ indicates a 99%
significance level. Data covers school years 1995-1996 through 2001-2002 in Texas.
likely to effect elementary school teachers less than middle and high school teachers.
Students tend to stay with the same teacher all day in the lower grades and thus are
taught all or most subjects by the same teacher. In the higher grades students see
several teachers throughout the day, each specializing in a subject.
Using a description of the tasks each teacher completes throughout the day as
well as the amount of time they spent on each task, I match students more closely to
the teacher who taught them each subject. I aggregate test scores by the grade level
and the subject of the exam as well as the campus at which the students attend to
measure the quality of the teachers.22 The amount of time a teacher spends each day
22This method requires a teacher to teach either math or reading/english to be
included in the sample. Thus, the number of teachers included using this method is
much smaller than the number of teachers included in the sample when matching test
scores at the campus level. In fact, matching test scores at the campus level allows
the inclusion of 312,492 individuals on average per school year into the regressions,
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on each task is used to weight the aggregated scores.23 In addition, since all of the
scores are on the same scale24, I estimate a model using all of the teachers and all
of the student scores simultaneously. The results of those estimations are presented
in Table 15. There is evidence that lower quality teachers were more likely to enter
the principal profession before the certification regime change, yet after the regime
change the probability that a high quality teacher enters the principal profession
increases. The conclusions are robust to the way in which the students’ test scores
are standardized.
F. A Robustness Check Using a Natural Experiment
One concern is that other unobserved factors that also changed at or near the time
the certification costs changed is affecting the results. If so, the estimated effects from
the previous section are falsely associated with changes in the certification costs. A
natural experiment framework will help to eliminate these concerns.
Since the root of the reduced costs come from the introduction of new alternative
training programs for principals, examination of where those programs opened and
who was and was not affected by this treatment will aid in the understanding of this
problem. One of the advantages of alternative training programs is the ability for a
trainee to remain employed and attend classes at night. This is however not possible
if the individual is too far from the training facility to commute on a daily basis.
Therefore, I presume those individuals who are close enough to drive to a training
whereas matching test scores to teachers at the campus, grade, and subject level
results in 24,383 individuals included per school year.
23Teachers who taught 6th grade math half of the time and 7th grade math the
other half are assigned a weighted average of the 6th and 7th grade math scores, for
example.
24Scores are standardized in three ways: z-scores, percentiles, and rank based z-
scores. See section IV.4 for more details.
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Table 15. Principal Entry, Teachers-Students Matched by Campus, Grade & Subject
Variable Estimate St. Error
Standardized Score
New Regime -0.0001 0.0005
∆ Score -0.0006** 0.0003
[∆ Score]*[New Regime] 0.0015*** 0.0005
Percentile
New Regime -0.0001 0.0005
∆ Score -0.0019** 0.0010
[∆ Score]*[New Regime] 0.0040*** 0.0015
Rank Based Z-Score
New Regime -0.0001 0.0005
∆ Score -0.0006** 0.0003
[∆ Score]*[New Regime] 0.0013*** 0.0005
Notes: The table shows estimated marginal effects of probit regressions where the
dependant variable is the probability of entering the principal profession. Regressions
include controls for gender, education, experience, wage premium, the probability of
promotion, and trends over time. Standard errors are shown in (·). An ’*’ indicates
estimates significant at a 90% level; ’**’ indicates a 95% significance level; and ’***’
indicates a 99% significance level. Data covers school years 1995-1996 through 2001-
2002 in Texas.
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facility are ’treated’ by the reduced costs and those too far to commute are considered
the ’control’ group. Individuals who were 100 miles away from an alternative training
program are included in the control group. Those who were within 100 miles from an
alternative training facility are assumed to be within a reasonable driving distance.
Since the control group includes only individuals in non-urban25 areas, the treatment
group is also constrained to non-urban school districts.
The observations classified as treatment and control are not greatly different.
Table 16 illustrates. In the treatment group, 2.9% are certified as a principal while
2.4% are certified in the control group. On average, those in the treatment group
faced 0.6 open positions in any given year. Some observed no open principal positions
while others observed as many as 6 open positions in their school district at any given
time. The control group faced similar employment prospects. At any given time, an
observation in the control group observed 0.5 open principal positions on average.
The minimum number of open positions in a district at any given time in the control
group is 0 while the maximum is 5 open principal jobs. In each group approximately
13% of the observations are male. The average experience in each group is nearly
the same. Individuals in the treatment group have 12.4 years of experience while
those in the control group have 13.4 years. Educational attainment between the two
groups in nearly the same as well with the treatment group having a slightly more
educated population. The only notable difference between the treatment and control
groups is the number of observations. The treatment group has nearly 4 times as
many observations as the control group with 20,357 instead of just 5,219.
Table 17 illustrates selected results of estimating equation (3.10) for the treat-
25An urban area is a core based statistical area defined by the U.S. Office of Man-
agement and Budget. This included both metropolitan areas consisting of a core of
50,000 people or more and micropolitan areas consisting of a core of 10,000 people
ore more.
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Table 16. Sample Statistics, Treatment and Control Groups
Treatment Control
Number of Observations 20,339 5,210
Certified as Principal 2.9% 2.4%
Number of Open Positions
Average .6 .5
Minimum 0 0
Maximum 6 5
Male 13.3% 13.1%
Experience 12.4 13.4
Bachelor’s Degree 80.6% 84.5%
Master’s Degree 18.6% 15.0%
Doctorate Degree 0.1% 0.0%
Notes: The table shows the sample statistics of treatment and con-
trol groups. Individuals in the Treatment group consist of those in-
dividuals who work at a non-urban school within 100 miles from an
alternative training facility. The Control group consists of employees
at non-urban schools located more than 100 miles from an alterna-
tive training program. Data covers school years 1995-1996 through
2001-2002 in Texas.
ment and control group separately. The results show that for the control group, those
too far from an alternative training facility to commute, the change in the certifica-
tion regime had no statistically significant effect. For those who were close enough
to commute to an alternative training program, the lower entry costs increases the
probability of entry by higher quality teachers, the same conclusion reached in the
previous section. Again, conclusions are robust to the way in which the students’ test
scores are standardized.
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Table 17. Principal Entry, Treatment and Control Groups
Treatment Control
Variable Estimate St. Error Estimate St. Error
Standardized Score
New Regime -0.0002 0.0015 0.0000 0.0003
∆ Score -0.0009 0.0006 -0.0000 0.0001
[∆ Score]*[New Regime] 0.0019** 0.0010 -0.0000 0.0001
Percentile
New Regime -0.0011 0.0015 0.0000 0.0003
∆ Score -0.0043** 0.0020 -0.0001 0.0005
[∆ Score]*[New Regime] 0.0057** 0.0032 -0.0000 0.0003
Rank Based Z-Score
New Regime -0.0012 0.0015 0.0000 0.0003
∆ Score -0.0010* 0.0006 -0.0000 0.0002
[∆ Score]*[New Regime] 0.0016* 0.0009 -0.0000 0.0000
Observations 20,339 5,210
Notes: The table shows estimated marginal effects of probit regressions where the
dependant variable is the probability of entering the principal profession. Teachers
and students are matched on the campus, grade, and subject level. Regressions
include controls for gender, education, experience, wage premium, the probability of
promotion, and trends over time. Standard errors are shown in (·). An ’*’ indicates
estimates significant at a 90% level; ’**’ indicates a 95% significance level; and ’***’
indicates a 99% significance level. Data covers school years 1995-1996 through 2001-
2002 in Texas.
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G. Conclusion
Certification and licensing requirements are emplaced in many service professions
to ensure all professionals meet a minimum competency standard, thus, attempting
to raise the quality of services. However, these requirements raise barriers to entry
that may discourage potential entrants. Talented potential entrants may seek outside
opportunities instead of incurring entry costs and therefore the effect of minimum
standards on the quality of the professionals is unclear.
I use the public school principal profession in Texas to examine this problem.
Results show evidence that the recent reduction in entry barriers to the principal
profession in Texas has encouraged less educated potential entrants more than highly
educated ones. Using student performance on TAAS exams as a proxy for teacher
quality, I find that reducing the costs of entry encourages high quality entrants more
than low quality ones. The talented teachers, no longer facing constraining entry
barriers, find it optimal to enter school administration to increase earnings instead
of seeking outside career advancement opportunities. These conclusions remain un-
changed when geographically dividing the data into control and treated groups.
Policy implications for the education sector are less clear. Raising entry hurdles
will decrease the quality of inputs into the principal profession, yet no evidence is
presented that shows schools become more or less effective. I leave that to future
research. In addition, providing incentives for high quality potential principals en-
courages the good teachers to leave the classroom. This may in fact have a negative
impact on students.
To the extent that these results can be applied to other labor market professions,
policy implications are more straightforward. Although a minimum quality standard
for professionals in a market is sought, licensing and certification requirements set
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too high can have negative impacts on the average quality of the entrants into a
profession. Care and consideration should be taken when designing the licensing
and/or certification hurdles so that the bar is not set so high as to discourage the
very highly talented individuals from entering the profession.
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CHAPTER IV
SCHOOL CHOICE AND THE COMPENSATION OF SCHOOL
ADMINISTRATORS
A. Introduction
One of the most important goals for society is to educate our youth and one of the
most influential factors affecting the quality of education is the choice that parents
have about where their child goes to school. If households (consumers of education)
have more choice between schools, competition may increase school productivity.
Many suggest that this choice comes from parents choosing a school district within a
metropolitan area based on their household preferences for public education. Com-
petition may have an effect on more than just student performance and per pupil
spending. Our school districts also interact in the labor market for teachers and
school administrators and the number and concentration of districts may play an
important role in how educators are compensated.
When households have many choices about schooling, school districts face com-
petitive pressure to increase efficiency and lower costs. The main expense of providing
education is the salaries of the educators and thus competition may reduce schools’
willingness and ability to pay educators well. However, schools are also concerned
about educational productivity and a competitive environment will demand more
adept leadership to manage our schools and install programs to aide teachers, help
children learn, and ultimately increase test scores.
This chapter examines the effect of increased school choice on the earnings and
abilities of school administrators. I use a rich dataset of personnel information for
educators in the public schools in Texas and variation in the data across individuals
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and across time allows for a clear identification of the effect. I find an overall pos-
itive effect of competition on administrators’ earnings suggesting that productivity
gains from hiring talented managers outweigh the pressure to reduce costs by cutting
salaries. However, the results are sensitive to the level of competition, the type of la-
bor market, and the administrators’ position. I control for possible endogeneity both
mechanically and with outside instruments and my conclusions largely unchanged.
B. Basic Model
If a school district administrator’s earnings are related to the amount of educational
choice in the market, one must consider the driving mechanism behind this relation-
ship the increase or decrease in earnings. The ”Fat and Happy” theory is that in a
market with low competitive pressure from other school districts, administrators are
able to pay themselves well. Thus, administrators operating in a highly competitive
educational market must use more of their available resources toward productivity.
A high level of Tiebout choice would be observed alongside low earnings of school
administrators. Hoxby (2000) finds that high levels of choice are associated with low
school expenditures, which corroborates this theory.
Alternatively, in the ”Talented Managers” theory school districts faced with high
competitive pressure due to school choice must hire very productive administrators
to avoid losing students to more productive school districts. These highly talented
administrators demand a high market wage. Therefore, choice and administrators’
earnings are positively correlated.
A third theory, ”Increased Effort,” also predicts positively correlated school
choice and administrator earnings. Administrators faced with pressure from com-
petition must put forth greater effort on the job. The increased effort must be re-
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warded with higher earnings otherwise administrators find outside opportunities more
attractive.
Assume that a school district administrator’s earnings, Eidm, are a function of the
amount of choice in the educational market, Cm, other characteristics of the market,
Xm, such as the price of housing or the cost of living, characteristics of the school
district, Xdm, and individual characteristics, Xidm,
Eidm = f(Cm, Xm, Xdm, Xidm) + εidm, (4.1)
for administrator i working for school district d in educational market m, where εidm
is an error term. The ”Fat and Happy” theory predicts that ∂f
∂Cm
< 0, whereas the
”Talented Manager” and ”Increased Effort” theories predict the opposite.
C. Administrator Productivity
Assume that school district administrators are rewarded for higher school productiv-
ity and student achievement. School productivity and student achievement are both
enhanced by competitive pressure in the market. 1 The observed positive relation-
ship between the level of choice and administrators’ earnings is biased due to the
correlation between school choice and the error term (which contains any relationship
between administrators’ earnings and school output measures). Many studies have
shown that agency costs are minimized by relating an executive’s compensation to
firm performance and to other variables that yield information regarding the actions
taken by the executive. Murphy (1986) finds that firm performance is positively
related to compensation changes for chief executive officers.
Suppose that an administrator’s earnings are a function of the effort that she
1See Hoxby (2000).
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exerts due to competitive pressure or school choice, Cm, the output in the school
district she manages, Qdm, and other characteristics about the administrator, the
district, and the market, νidm so that
Eidm = g(Cm, Qdm) + νidm, (4.2)
where Eidm is the salary that administrator i earns working for school district d in
market m. Suppose also that the output the district produces, Qdm, depends on the
competitive structure of the market and other factors, or
Qdm = h(Cm) + ξdm. (4.3)
Then, the overall effect of increased choice in the market on the district administra-
tor’s salary is
∂Eidm
∂Cm
=
∂g
∂Cm
+
∂g
∂Qdm
∂Qdm
∂Cm
. (4.4)
The term ∂g
∂Cm
is the direct effect of increased competition on an administrator’s
earnings due to the increased effort when faced with stronger competitive pressures.
If administrators are rewarded for their increased efforts, then ∂g
∂Cm
> 0. If the ”Fat
and Happy” theory applies, when faced with stiffer competition, administrators must
take a cut in pay in order to focus more financial resources towards production, or
∂g
∂Cm
< 0.
The term ∂g
∂Qdm
∂Qdm
∂Cm
is the indirect effect of increased competition on the admin-
istrator’s earnings due to changes in the performance of the district when faced with
stronger competition. The first part of the the indirect effect, ∂g
∂Qdm
, is the reward the
district gives to the administrator for increased district productivity. For incentive
compatibility assume that ∂g
∂Qdm
> 0. The second part of the indirect effect is the
change in district output due to an increase in competition. Hoxby (2000) shows
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that student achievement and productivity later in life increases with school choice,
or ∂Qdm
∂Cm
> 0.
The ambiguity in the sign of the net effect of increased choice on earnings war-
rants further inquiry. If ∂g
∂Cm
< 0 and the indirect effect is larger than the direct effect,
then it is the increased output and student achievement that the administrators are
rewarded for and finding a positive effect of higher choice on earnings misleads one
to support the incorrect ”Talented Managers” theory.
D. Endogeneity
There is reason to question the assumption of an exogenously determined level of
Tiebout choice in a market. Suppose that school administrators are hired and com-
pensated for their ability to enhance student achievement and overall school produc-
tivity. A district in an educational market hires a talented administrator and pays the
individual a fair market wage for her talents. The talented manager increases student
performance and efficiency in the district. Households in the market observe the new
high student performance in that district and move into that community, changing
relative sizes of all districts in the market. In the limit, all households move into the
high performing district and as a result there is no choice left in that market. If the
cost of moving is sufficiently large, enough households will not move. However, the
same conclusion follows where districts are acquired by or merge with a more efficient
one.
E. Data
In this study, I take advantage of a very rich set of data that is collected by the Texas
Education Agency (TEA). The TEA is the statewide administrative unit that guides
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Table 18. Summary Statistics by School Year and Educational Market Type
Number of
School Year Administrators Earnings Choice Index
Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
1998-99 13,712 48,081 8,621 0.766 0.222
1999-00 14,282 50,598 9,259 0.771 0.222
2000-01 14,705 52,202 9,324 0.772 0.223
2001-02 15,188 53,755 9,846 0.777 0.224
2002-03 15,707 54,770 10,073 0.782 0.219
All Years 73,594 51,991 9,749 0.774 0.222
Metropolitan 67,253 52,480 9,838 0.815 0.175
Micropolitan 6,341 46,805 6,868 0.339 0.202
Notes: There are twenty-six Metropolitan Statistical Areas and forty-one Micropoli-
tan Statistical Areas defined by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
and oversees primary and secondary public education in Texas. Some of the duties of
the TEA include managing textbook adoption, developing the statewide curriculum,
rating school districts under the accountability system, monitoring for compliance
with federal guidelines, serving as a fiscal agent for the distribution of state funds,
and most importantly for this research, collecting data on public school students,
staff, and finances. The TEA has collected data on public school system personnel
salaries as well as demographics, years of experience, education, gender, and other
individual characteristics. Also, enrollment at each campus and within each district
is tracked. The data available covers all the school districts in the state (over 1000)
for five school years, from the 1998-1999 school year through the 2002-2003 school
year. These data are not publicly available.
Staff members who are not teachers or teachers’ aids are considered administra-
tors in the public school districts. These include principals and assistant principals,
superintendents and assistant superintendents, human resource directors, tax asses-
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sors, business managers, athletic directors, and instructional officers. All of these
positions operate on the school district level with the exception of principals and
assistant principals, who operate on the campus level. Table 18 shows summary sta-
tistics for administrators’ salaries. Salaries and the total number of school district
administrators increase each year of the sample. These changes are not unexpected.
The salary increases closely track inflation rates over the period and the changes in
the number of employees is consistent with population growth in Texas.
F. Educational Markets
The 2000 labor market definitions provided by the Executive Office of the President
- Office of Management and Budget (OMB) list twenty-six traditional metropolitan
areas for the state of Texas. Also, forty-one newly defined micropolitan areas are now
listed. These are rural areas that have at least one cluster of between 10,000 and
50,000 people, plus adjacent territory that has a high degree of social and economic
activity. Micropolitan markets provide an added level of variation in the data. In
locations not a part of a metropolitan and micropolitan statistical area, I use the
county as the educational market.
Notice in Table 18 that the average salary for school administrators is $52,480
per year for those who work in metropolitan markets and $46,805 per year for those
who work in smaller micropolitan areas, significantly less. This suggests that the
type of market, urban or non-urban, as well as the cost of living in each market is a
determining factor in an administrator’s salary.
While Hoxby (2000) obtains variation in the level of school choice by using edu-
cational markets in different states and geographical areas of the country, I do it by
including micropolitan markets as well as metropolitan markets.
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G. Measuring Educational Choice
There are several ways in which one may define a measure of Tiebout choice in this
framework. Hoxby (2000) suggests three measures for the level of choice present in
the market. One may use the number of school districts in the educational market
as the level of choice facing a household. This measure weights each district equally,
regardless of the relative size (either in land area or population) of the school district.
The other two measures offered by Hoxby (2000) are indices based on a Herfidahl-
Hirshman index of the market shares of each district. They differ only in the way
in which one calculates the market share for each school district. One could assume
that the share of the market that a particular district captures is represented by its
share of the total land are for that educational market. The measure is adequate if
households locate randomly in space. However, commuting distances to employment
centers and other attractions play a role in the location decision of the households.
Therefore, Hoxby’s third measure, in which the market share of a district is defined
as the proportion of the students in that market who attend school in that district, is
the best choice. As Hoxby (2000) explains, this measure has a nice interpretation. It
is the probability that a student would find herself in a school district if she were to
switch places with another student in the educational market at random. This is the
measure that I use in the analysis to follow. Explicitly, the level of choice in market
m, Cm, is defined as Cm = 1 − Hm, where Hm is the Herfindahl-Hirshman index
for market m, or the sum of the squared market shares for all school districts in the
market. A value of Cm close to zero indicates that households living in that market
have little choice over which school district to locate. Likely, one large school district
dominates nearly the entire market. A value of Cm close to one suggests that there
are many small school districts in the market from which a household can choose.
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I compute the choice index for each educational market in the sample. Subse-
quently each school district in the educational market is assigned the appropriate
value of the choice index. And, administrators are assigned a value of the choice
index based on the district in which they are employed. Table 18 reports summary
statistics for the choice index. The average value of the index has been slowly in-
creasing over time: in the last period it is only 1% higher than in the first period.
A large difference in mean values of the index exists between the metropolitan and
micropolitan areas. The metropolitan markets have on average much more choice
than do the micropolitan areas. This finding is to be expected. In smaller markets,
fewer choices in education, as well as in other factors that influence location decisions,
exist.
H. Empirical Evidence
To test the predictions of the effect of Tiebout choice on school administrators’ earn-
ings I assume that f(·) takes a linear form and estimate the following empirical
specification.
log(earnings)idmt = α + βchoicemt + γlog(housing price)mt
+δ1Xidmt + δ2Xdmt + λt + εidmt, (4.5)
for administrator i working in school district d in labor marketm during school year t.
Earnings are measured by a school administrator’s annual salary, choice is measured
by the choice index based on district enrollment, housing price is the average price
of housing in the market and is included as a proxy for cost of living, Xidmt is a vector
of individual characteristics commonly thought to be related to earnings, and Xdmt
is a vector of school district demographics. λt allows for differences across time. I
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report ordinary least squares estimates in Tables 19 and 20.
The first column of Tables 19 and 20 reports the results for the fully-specified
model.2 Holding fixed labor market characteristics, cost of living, variations across
time, individual level characteristics, and district level student characteristics, a mar-
ginal increase in the choice index leads to 6.2% higher earnings for school admin-
istrators. Individual characteristics measured include the administrator’s age and
experience in the Texas public school system. I include indicators for administra-
tors’s race and/or ethnicity as well as indicators for sex and educational attainment.
The base group for comparison is a white female with a bachelor’s degree. Results
are expected. Earnings increase with age and experience. African Americans earn
slightly less than whites (0.9%), Hispanics earn more than whites (2.1%), and there
is no significant difference between the earnings of Asian and white administrators.
Men earn 3.4% more than women. Returns to higher education are prevalent; admin-
istrators with a Master’s degree earn 5.6% more than those with a Bachelor’s degree,
holding other factors fixed. Administrator’s holding a Ph.D. earn 15% more than
someone with only a Bachelor’s degree. I include district level student characteristics
to proxy for variations in non-monetary rewards. If the students in a district are
difficult to work with or the district is crowded, the efforts of the administrator is
higher and the administrator must be justly compensated. Failing to control for these
factors affecting an administrator’s earnings could bias the estimate of the effect of
choice on earnings.
Under the ”Talented Manager” theory, controlling for individual characteristics
that might be related to personal productivity may not reveal the true effect of choice
2Tables 19 and 20 report robust standard errors clustering on individuals. Ap-
pendix D compares those standard errors to robust standard errors by labor market.
Although the standard errors by labor market are generally larger, inference about
the effect of school choice on administrators’ earnings is not affected.
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Table 19. Estimates of the Log-Earnings Equation; Market and Individual Character-
istics
OLS(1) OLS(2) Fixed Random
Market Characteristics
Index of Choice 0.062*** 0.061*** 0.038*** 0.051***
0.006 0.007 0.008 0.006
Urban District 0.029*** 0.038*** -0.028*** 0.009***
0.004 0.005 0.006 0.004
Log(Avg. Housing Price) 0.047*** 0.027*** 0.081*** 0.053***
0.004 0.005 0.004 0.003
Individual Characteristics
Age 0.005*** —– —– —–
0.000 —– —– —–
Experience 0.005*** —– —– —–
0.000 —– —– —–
Black -0.009*** —– —– —–
0.003 —– —– —–
Hispanic 0.021*** —– —– —–
0.003 —– —– —–
Asian -0.015 —– —– —–
0.020 —– —– —–
Male 0.034*** —– —– —–
0.002 —– —– —–
High School Diploma 0.002 —– —– —–
0.007 —– —– —–
Master’s Degree 0.056*** —– —– —–
0.003 —– —– —–
Doctorate 0.150*** —– —– —–
0.006 —– —– —–
Notes: Results of the above models are continued in the next table. The dependent
variable is the log of annual salary for public school administrators in Texas. All
regressions include a constant. Each regression contains 72,493 observations and
robust standard errors are reported for the OLS regressions assuming an individual
level cluster effect. An ’*’ indicates estimates significant at a 90% level; ’**’ indicates
a 95% significance level; and ’***’ indicates a 99% significance level.
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Table 20. Estimates of the Log-Earnings Equation; District Characteristics
OLS(1) OLS(2) Fixed Random
District Characteristics
TAAS Performance 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 0.000***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
District Enrollment(1,000’s) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Special Education 0.305*** 0.197*** -0.014 0.041
0.078 0.095 0.057 0.051
Immigrants 0.568*** 0.499*** 0.142*** 0.215***
0.046 0.051 0.025 0.023
Economically Disadvantaged -0.025*** -0.005*** -0.021*** -0.011***
0.007 0.008 0.006 0.005
School Year Dummies
1999-00 0.047*** 0.047*** 0.064*** 0.064***
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
2000-01 0.076*** 0.073*** 0.110*** 0.109***
0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001
2001-02 0.095*** 0.093*** 0.152*** 0.150***
0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001
2002-03 0.104*** 0.102*** 0.189*** 0.186***
0.002 0.003 0.002 0.001
Notes: Results of the above models are continued from the previous table. The
dependent variable is the log of annual salary for public school administrators in
Texas. All regressions include a constant. Each regression contains 72,493 obser-
vations and robust standard errors are reported for the OLS regressions assuming
an individual level cluster effect. The variable TAASPerformance measures the
fraction of students in the school district that passed all the required TAAS exami-
nations. SpecialEducation measures the percentage of students in the district who
require special needs. Immigrants measures the percentage of students in the dis-
trict that have immigrated from a foreign country. EconomicallyDisadvantaged is
a variable that measures the percentage of students who are poor. An ’*’ indicates
estimates significant at a 90% level; ’**’ indicates a 95% significance level; and ’***’
indicates a 99% significance level.
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on earnings. Column 2 reports the results of a parsimonious model controlling only
for market characteristics. This specification allows for administrators operating in
urban markets to earn higher salaries, after controlling for differences in the cost
of living, time, district level student characteristics, and the amount of educational
choice. Given the type of labor market, the cost of housing, student characteristics
and the school year, a marginal increase in the choice index leads to 6.1% higher
earnings for school administrators.
The signs and magnitudes of the choice effect on administrator earnings in each
OLS specification are similar. Either individual ability is not correlated with the
amount of choice in the market or the metrics used poorly proxy ability.
1. Individual Ability
I assume the included individual characteristics proxy ability. However, given the
structure of the data, I propose the following two-way error component model to
account for ability.
log(earnings)idmt = α+ βchoicemt + γlog(housing price)mt
+δ2Xdmt + µi + λt + νidmt, (4.6)
where µi captures the individual administrator’s ability, λt allows for differences across
time, and νidmt is a classical exogenous error term.
I estimate the above specification in two different ways and report the results in
Table 19 and 20. First, I estimate a fixed effects model. Choice has a positive effect,
yet the magnitude of the effect is approximately half as large as in the OLS specifica-
tions. The inability of the individual characteristics to perfectly proxy administrator’s
ability and the important effect of ability on earnings are possible explanations for the
difference in magnitudes. In this model the ability level of the administrators is fixed
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and thus variation due to a district hiring talented administrators is not observed.
Therefore, if the overall positive effect of more school choice on earnings originates
both from the ”Talented Managers” theory and the ”Increased Efforts” theory, then
the fixed effects model, having controlled for administrator talent, finds only the effect
of more choice on earnings due to increased administrator efforts. The second OLS
specification, allowing for differences in administrator talent, illustrates the overall
impact of school choice on school earnings.
The fixed effects model yields consistent but inefficient estimates. Making some
simple assumptions about the µi, the random effects model provides consistent and
efficient estimates, if the assumptions are met. First, it is assumed that the the µi
are random, that is µi ∼ IID(0, σ2µ), and the µi are independent of the νidmt. Also
the random effects model assumes that choice, log(housing price), and Xdmt are
independent of the the µi. This may or may not be true. If school districts under
competitive pressure hire more talented administrators the level of choice may be
correlated with the average ability levels of administrators in that market. District
level student characteristics such as the percent of the student population requiring
special education may also be correlated with the ability levels of the administrators.
It is not difficult to argue that a large number of students with special needs is more
challenging to manage and requires a more talented manager.
The random effects model results in a conclusion not unlike the previous models.
I find if the assumptions described above are true, the effect of a marginal increase
in school choice on the earnings of school administrators is a 5.1% increase in salary.
The positive effect is consistent with the ”Talented Managers” theory. However, if
this theory is true the assumptions of the model are violated, rendering results neither
efficient nor consistent. To this extent, evidence provided by the fixed effects model
are preferred over the random effects model despite its inefficiency.
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2. The Hausman-Taylor Model
Assuming the endogeneity described above occurs only through the individual ability
component of the error term in the two-way error component specification, Hausman
and Taylor (1981) suggest taking advantage of exogenous components of the covari-
ates to instrument for the endogenous regressors. Explicitly, assume the following
empirical specification,
ln(earnings)it = βXit + γZi + µi + νit, (4.7)
where Xit= [X
1
it, Cit] and Zi=[Z
1
i , NoDegreei, Master
′sDegreei, Doctoratei]. Xit is
a matrix of regressors that vary over time and across individuals. Xit is comprised
of both exogenous covariates, X1it, and choice, Cit, assumed to be endogenous. Zi is
a matrix of time invariant regressors. Some of which are exogenous, Z1i , while others
are assumed to be endogenous. I assume an administrator’s education is endogenous
as it is highly correlated with the ability component of the error term. NoDegreei,
Master′sDegreei, and Doctoratei are indicators for the highest college degree ob-
tained by the individual and the default degree is a bachelor’s degree.
The first column of Table 21 shows that controlling for possible endogeneity of
educational choice does not change the coefficient estimates, in either sign or mag-
nitude. The estimated effects are consistent with the prediction of the ”Talented
Manager” theory. This conclusion may lead one to believe that the concern about
endogeneity is unwarranted or that the Hausman-Taylor specification does a poor job
of correcting for it.
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Table 21. Estimates of the Log-Earnings Equation, Controlling for Endogeneity
Hausman Instrumental Variables Models
Taylor Fixed G2SLS EC2SLS
Market Characteristics
Index of Choice 0.043*** 0.034*** 0.055*** 0.098***
0.010 0.009 0.006 0.014
Urban District -0.026*** -0.037*** 0.021*** -0.008
0.006 0.006 0.007 0.006
Log(Avg. Housing Price) 0.070*** 0.084*** 0.063*** 0.042***
0.005 0.005 0.006 0.005
Hausman Tests
X2 —– 1,252.7 1,945.8 1,878.7
p-value —– 0.000 0.000 0.000
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of annual salary for public school administra-
tors in Texas. All regressions include a constant as well as individual characteristics,
district characteristics, and school year indicator variables found in the model spec-
ifications shown in Tables 19 and 20. Each regression contains 72,493 observations.
An ’*’ indicates estimates significant at a 90% level; ’**’ indicates a 95% significance
level; and ’***’ indicates a 99% significance level.
3. Outside Instruments
For those readers not swayed by the evidence provided using the Hausman-Taylor
model, I use an outside instrument for school choice. I propose a market performance
index that aims to measure the pressure for a household to ”switch” to another school
district. Let
mpim,t =
∑
d
(Pd,m,t−1 − P.,m,t−1)2, (4.8)
where mpim,t is the market performance index of market m at time t, Pd,m,t−1 is the
mean performance of the students on standardized tests in district d, in market m,
at time t − 1, and P.,m,t−1 is the mean performance of all students in market m at
time t− 1.
To illustrate what this index is measuring consider the example in Table 22.
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Table 22. Market Performance Index Example
TAAS Passing Rate Market Avg. Distance to Mean Distance2
Market Situation 1
District 1 78 72 6 39
District 2 67 72 -5 23
District 3 70 72 -2 3
District 4 72 72 0 0
Market Performance Index: 65
Market Situation 2
District 1 98 77 21 452
District 2 67 77 -10 95
District 3 70 77 -7 46
District 4 72 77 -5 23
Market Performance Index: 615
Table 22 shows two possible situations in which an educational market can find itself.
In the first situation, the students in all the districts perform about the same on
standardized tests. Therefore if households choose a school district based on observed
outcomes such as average test scores, the pressure for a household to switch districts
in a market in this situation is low. Accordingly, the market performance index is low
here. In contrast, consider situation 2. In this situation, one school district is greatly
outperforming all the others in the market. The pressure for a household to move to
that district is high because the reward from moving, in terms of better schools, is
great. It is more likely that households will move to the winning district in situation
2, and therefore the market performance index in that situation is higher.
Since it is the movement of households to the successful district that renders
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the level of choice endogenous, the pressure for households to move is negatively
correlated with the level of choice in the educational market. The market perfor-
mance index relies on the relative performance of all the students in the market, not
just those supervised by an administrator working in a particular district. As such,
the performance index is uncorrelated with an individual administrator’s earnings.
Therefore, the market performance index is a valid instrument and can be used to
control for endogeneity.
I base the market performance index on the passing rate on the standardized
state-wide TAAS test. I use the results of three tests, math, science, and writing, to
compute three indices to measure the pressure on a household to move across districts.
I therefore have three outside instruments, mpimath, mpireading, and mpiwriting, to
control for endogeneity.
The last three columns of Table 21 summarize the results of an instrumental vari-
ables two-way error-component model estimation. The fixed effects model controlling
for choice endogeneity yields results not unlike those found in the standard fixed ef-
fects model. However, the efficiency of the fixed effects model is not the best. The
random effects instrumental variables model or generalized two stage least squares,
G2SLS, shows again a positive effect of Tiebout choice on the earnings of school ad-
ministrators. Not surprisingly, an error component two stage least squares, EC2SLS,
approach shows results similar to G2SLS. Controlling for ability of the administrators
and possible endogeneity in the level of choice available to households I again find
evidence in support of the ”Talented Managers” theory on the relationship between
administrators’ earnings and school competition.
To test for endogeneity and illustrate the validity of the instruments, the results
of Hausman tests are included. I compare the instrumental variables model with
fixed effects to the original fixed effects model that does not control for endogeneity.
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I reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients estimates in the two models are
the same, suggesting that the instrumental variables model is appropriate. Similar
conclusions result when comparing G2SLS and EC2SLS to the random effects model
not controlling for endogeneity. Also, partial F-statistic from the first stage regression
is 5,479.6. An F-statistic greater than 10 suggests valid instruments, a commonly
accepted rule-of-thumb. The partial R2 from the first stage regression is 0.204.
4. Split Sample Results
An interesting continuity gap in the relationship between choice and earnings is
present. As Figure 6 makes clear, there is a gap in the data around a value of 0.8
for the index of level of choice. For values of the index below this mark, low choice,
it appears that no relationship exists between choice and earnings. After the break,
the high index value, there is a positive relationship with possibly a larger variance
in earnings.
I examine this further by splitting the data into two groups. One sample for
administrators in markets with high competition (index > 0.8), and one sample for
administrators in low index markets. The results of these regressions are shown in
Table 23. Results of the split-sample regressions show that indeed there exists a
large positive effect of choice on administrators’ salary for markets that are highly
competitive. In markets that are either moderately competitive or uncompetitive, the
positive effect is absent. In fact, in some specifications there is a very small negative
effect of school competition on earnings.
The relationship between administrators’ earnings and school choice also breaks
down when estimating separate regressions for administrators in urban and rural
areas. I find a positive effect for those administrators who work in urban markets and
no effect or a negative effect for non-urban administrators. This suggests that both
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Fig. 6. Plot of Mean Log(Salary) Versus Index of School Choice
theories, ”Fat & Happy” and ”Talented Managers,” may be plausible.
5. Sub-Sample Results
It is reasonable to assume that the behavior of a district-level administrator is dif-
ferent from the behavior of a campus-level administrator. On-campus administrators
work more closely with the students, are more accessible to parents, and can be held
accountable for outcomes more directly. Off-campus administrators may have a more
business oriented job description while on-campus administrators tend more toward
education responsibilities. Therefore, as a robustness check, I divide the sample by
on-campus or off-campus status.
Table 24 summarizes the results of each model estimated for on-campus and
off-campus administrators and them to the results from the full sample. In most
of the models the effect of choice on earnings is no longer present for off-campus
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Table 23. Split Sample Regression Results, Estimated Coefficient on Index of Choice
in Log-Earnings Model, By Method of Estimation
School Choice Choice > 0.8 Choice < 0.8 Urban Rural
OLS 0.111*** -0.043*** 0.078*** -0.039***
0.021 0.005 0.004 0.008
Between 0.048 -0.038*** 0.075*** -0.024*
0.038 0.008 0.007 0.014
Fixed Effects 0.270*** -0.002 0.050*** -0.087***
0.052 0.014 0.011 0.020
Random Effects 0.186*** -0.023*** 0.070*** -0.063***
0.034 0.008 0.007 0.013
Hausman-Taylor 0.402*** 0.002 0.065*** -0.070***
0.059 0.013 0.013 0.017
IV Regressions
Fixed Effects 0.231*** 0.002 0.043*** -0.070***
0.057 0.014 0.012 0.020
G2SLS 0.215*** -0.034*** 0.077*** -0.065***
0.035 0.008 0.007 0.013
EC2SLS 0.242*** -0.036*** 0.077*** -0.068***
0.035 0.008 0.007 0.013
Notes: Specifications are similar to those in Tables 19 and 20. Standard Errors are
reported below coefficient estimates. An ’*’ indicates estimates significant at a 90%
level; ’**’ indicates a 95% significance level; and ’***’ indicates a 99% significance
level.
administrators. For on-campus administrators, however, the positive effect remains
and is often larger than the estimated effect for the full sample.
I. Conclusion
I find evidence that Tiebout choice is positively related to school district administra-
tors’ earnings, a conclusion consistent with two theories. The first theory, ”Talented
Managers,” suggests schools under competitive pressure pay more to hire talented in-
dividuals as administrators. In the second theory, ”Increased Efforts,” administrators
faced with pressure from competition must put forth greater effort on the job. The
increased effort must be rewarded with higher earnings otherwise administrators find
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Table 24. Sub-Sample Regression Results, Estimated Coefficient on Index of Choice
in Log-Earnings Model, By Method of Estimation
All School Off Campus On Campus
School Choice Administrators Administrators Administrators
OLS 0.064*** 0.037*** 0.066***
0.006 0.011 0.003
Fixed Effects 0.037*** 0.007 0.046***
0.008 0.025 0.009
Random Effects 0.050*** 0.008 0.059***
0.006 0.016 0.006
Hausman-Taylor 0.043*** -0.008 0.054***
0.010 0.018 0.007
IV Regressions
Fixed Effects 0.034*** 0.000 0.047***
0.009 0.027 0.010
G2SLS 0.055*** 0.017 0.063***
0.006 0.015 0.006
EC2SLS 0.054*** 0.015 0.063***
0.006 0.016 0.006
Notes: Specifications are similar to those in Tables 19 and 20. Standard Errors are
reported below coefficient estimates. An ’*’ indicates estimates significant at a 90%
level; ’**’ indicates a 95% significance level; and ’***’ indicates a 99% significance
level.
outside opportunities more attractive.
This finding is robust to model specification. I estimate OLS, fixed effects, and
random effects models and the conclusion remains the same. Concerned that the level
of school choice is endogenous, I estimate a Hausman-Taylor model assuming that
the degree held by an administrator is correlated with individual ability and therefore
also endogenous. I construct an outside instrument, the market performance index,
that is negatively correlated with the level of school choice yet uncorrelated with
an individual administrator’s ability. The results of estimating model controlling for
endogeneity agree with my previous conclusion.
The data is split into two groups, low to moderate school choice and high school
choice. I find that there is no relationship between school choice and administrators’
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earnings in the low to moderate choice education markets. In the highly competitive
markets, there is a statistically significant positive relationship between the level of
school choice and administrators’ earnings.
Further robustness checks compare urban areas to rural areas. Evidence is con-
sistent with the ”Talented Manager” theory in urban areas. However, no evidence
exist to suggest there is a relationship between the level of school choice in rural
areas and administrators’ earnings. Also, on-campus administrators earn a premium
in more competitive education markets but off-campus administrators do not.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
This dissertation studies public school administrators, some of the choices they make,
and some of the factors that influence those choices. Many people have studied teacher
labor markets, interested in factors that may increase the quality of education within
a state or country. Few, however, have considered issues facing school administrators.
Over a ten year period from 1994 until 2004 the gender composition of teachers
and principals in Texas public schools suggests that men are over-represented in the
administrative ranks comprising 48% of the principals and only 22% of the teachers.
The number of principals, however, declines over this period. Since specific training
and certification is required to serve as a principal in Texas, I identify those individuals
who desire advancement and are qualified for the job. I show there is no statistically
significant difference in the probability of promotion between men and women over
this time period. I further show using duration analysis that women in fact face
a higher hazard of promotion to principal than men in Texas public schools. Men
face their highest hazard of promotion four years after becoming certified. Women’s
hazard rates peak at six or seven years after certification. This result is consistent with
Affirmative Action for women as well as the theory that men face more opportunities
outside of education and are less committed to the education sector. Further analysis
shows however that men do not leave Texas public schools more frequently than
women. In fact, women are more likely to leave if they are not promoted.
Certification and licensing requirements raise barriers to entry that may discour-
age potential entrants. I use the public school principal profession in Texas to show
evidence that the recent reduction in entry barriers to the principal profession in
Texas has encouraged less educated potential entrants more than highly educated
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ones. Using student performance on TAAS exams as a proxy for teacher quality, I
find that reducing the costs of entry encourages high quality entrants more than low
quality ones. The talented teachers, no longer facing constraining entry barriers, find
it optimal to enter school administration to increase earnings instead of seeking out-
side career advancement opportunities. These conclusions remain unchanged when
geographically dividing the data into control and treated groups.
Policy implications for the education sector are not clear. Raising entry hurdles
will decrease the quality of inputs into the principal profession, yet no evidence is
presented that shows schools become more or less effective. I leave that to future
research. In addition, providing incentives for high quality potential principals en-
courages the good teachers to leave the classroom. This may in fact have a negative
impact on students.
I find evidence that Tiebout choice is positively related to school district admin-
istrators’ earnings, a conclusion consistent with two theories. This finding is robust to
model specification. I estimate OLS, fixed effects, and random effects models and the
conclusion remains the same. Concerned that the level of school choice is endogenous,
I estimate a Hausman-Taylor model assuming that the degree held by an administra-
tor is correlated with individual ability and therefore also endogenous. I construct an
outside instrument, the market performance index, that is negatively correlated with
the level of school choice yet uncorrelated with an individual administrator’s ability.
The results of estimating a model controlling for endogeneity agree with my previous
conclusion.
The data is split into two groups, low to moderate school choice and high school
choice. I find that there is no relationship between school choice and administrators’
earnings in the low to moderate choice education markets. In the highly competitive
markets, there is a statistically significant positive relationship between the level of
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school choice and administrators’ earnings. Further robustness checks compare urban
areas to rural areas and on-campus to off-campus administrators.
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APPENDIX A
SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES FOR CHAPTER II
Table 25. Principal Attrition Rates
School Year No Longer Principal Back to Classroom
1995-96 16.5% 1.5%
1996-97 18.4% 1.4%
1997-98 16.0% 1.4%
1998-99 22.0% 1.4%
1999-00 22.4% 1.6%
2000-01 18.9% 1.2%
2001-02 19.0% 1.5%
2002-03 17.9% 1.5%
2003-04 16.3% 1.4%
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Table 26. Advanced Degrees and Principal Certification
Years Since Certification Master’s Degree Doctorate
1 75.7% 1.5%
2 83.1% 1.8%
3 87.1% 2%
4 88.8% 2.3%
5 90.1% 2.6%
6 91.1% 3.2%
7 91.5% 3.8%
8 91.7% 4.4%
9 91.8% 4.7%
10 92.2% 5.1%
11 91.9% 5.5%
12 91.7% 6%
13 91.3% 6.5%
14 90.8% 7%
15 90.4% 7.5%
16 89.9% 8%
17 90% 8%
18 89.5% 8.6%
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Table 27. Probability of Being a Principal, Probit Regressions, Metropolitan and Mi-
cropolitan Labor Market Statistics
Variable Full Sample Certified as a Principal
Coefficient Marginal Effect Coefficient Marginal Effect
Male 0.152*** 0.002*** 0.009 0.002
0.005 0.000 0.006 0.002
Teaching Experience -0.002*** 0.000*** 0.005*** 0.001***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Master’s Degree 1.022*** 0.022*** 0.243*** 0.064***
0.007 0.000 0.012 0.003
Doctorate Degree 0.882*** 0.029*** 0.086*** 0.025***
0.014 0.001 0.017 0.005
Black -0.118*** 0.000*** -0.149*** -0.040***
0.008 0.000 0.010 0.003
Hispanic 0.090*** 0.001*** 0.012*** 0.003
0.006 0.000 0.008 0.002
Asian -0.336*** -0.002*** -0.210** -0.054**
0.046 0.000 0.065 0.016
Native American 0.041 0.000 -0.063 -0.017
0.040 0.000 0.051 0.014
Open Positions 0.019*** 0.000*** 0.024*** 0.007***
0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
Number Certified -0.008*** 0.000*** -0.011*** -0.003***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Age of Certification
1 to 5 years old 1.872*** 0.100*** 0.973*** 0.301***
0.009 0.001 0.024 0.008
6 to 10 years old 2.317*** 0.203*** 1.512*** 0.506***
0.009 0.002 0.024 0.008
11 to 15 years old 2.333*** 0.210*** 1.591*** 0.544***
0.010 0.003 0.025 0.008
16 to 20 years old 2.228*** 0.183*** 1.538*** 0.537***
0.011 0.003 0.026 0.009
21 to 25 years old 2.092*** 0.152*** 1.455*** 0.521***
0.014 0.003 0.027 0.009
More than 25 years 1.818*** 0.097*** 1.261*** 0.455***
0.019 0.003 0.030 0.011
Notes: This table shows estimated probit models for the probability of promotion to
school principal. The Full Sample consists of 3,222,624 observations and the restricted
sample consists of 252,321 observations. An ’*’ indicates estimates significant at a
90% level; ’**’ indicates a 95% significance level; and ’***’ indicates a 99% significance
level.
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Table 28. Time to Promotion to Principal, Metropolitan and Micropolitan Labor Mar-
ket Statistics
Variable Separate Models
Men Women
Teaching Experience 0.982 1.046***
0.010 0.011
Experience Squared 0.998*** 0.997***
0.000 0.000
Master’s Degree 0.654*** 0.593***
0.042 0.037
Doctorate Degree 0.295*** 0.358***
0.041 0.039
Black 1.015*** 0.780
0.072 0.043
Hispanic 0.949 1.184***
0.472 0.051
Asian 0.967 0.919
0.433 0.326
Native American 1.683** 0.870
0.452 0.308
Open Positions 1.049*** 1.066***
0.002 0.002
Number Certified 0.987*** 0.987***
0.002 0.002
Observations 70,383 101,983
Notes: The regressions fit a Cox proportional hazards model in which the dependant
variable is time until promotion to school principal measured in years after certifica-
tion. Standard errors appear under the estimated hazard ratios for each covariate.
OpenPositions and NumberCertified are measured as the number of individuals
per 1,000 labor market employees. An ’*’ indicates estimates significant at a 90%
level; ’**’ indicates a 95% significance level; and ’***’ indicates a 99% significance
level.
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SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES FOR CHAPTER III
Table 29. Teacher-Principal Mobility Rates
Year Certified Number Certified Same District
1996 1,319 83.7%
1997 1,228 85.4%
1998 1,117 80.4%
1999 1,820 83.7%
2000 874 81.6%
2001 1,304 81.3%
2002 1,536 79.0%
2003 1,865 83.7%
All Years 11,063 82.5%
Notes: The table shows the percentage of certified prin-
cipals who stay in the same school district in which they
were employed before becoming certified. This includes
individuals who were employed by the same district the
year before certification and the year after certification.
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Table 30. The Wage Premium Model
Variable Estimate St. Error
A 0.417*** 0.002
Bachelors Degree 0.154*** 0.000
Masters Degree 0.222*** 0.000
Doctorate 0.376*** 0.001
Experience 0.018*** 0.000
Age 0.000*** 0.000
Male 0.054*** 0.000
Hispanic 0.023*** 0.000
African American 0.022*** 0.000
Asian 0.039*** 0.001
Native American 0.008*** 0.002
A*[Bach. - Bach.] -0.017** 0.007
A*[Mast. - Mast.] -0.147*** 0.007
A*[Doc. - Doc.] -0.241*** 0.007
A*[Exp. - Exp.] -0.009*** 0.000
A*[Age - Age] -0.001*** 0.000
A*[Male - Male] -0.066*** 0.001
A*[Hisp. - Hisp.] -0.009*** 0.002
A*[Afr. - Afr.] -0.016*** 0.003
A*[Asian - Asian] -0.207*** 0.017
A*[Native - Native] -0.008 0.012
R2 0.6494
Notes: This table shows the estimated wage premium model where
the dependant variable is the log of annual earnings. A is an indicator
variable equal to 1 if the individual is employed as a principal and
zero otherwise. Data covers school years 1994-1995 through 2003-
2004 in Texas. Education measures are indicator variables for the
highest degree attained. An ’*’ indicates estimates significant at a
90% level; ’**’ indicates a 95% significance level; and ’***’ indicates a
99% significance level. The estimated wage premium is log(wa/wc) =
0.417, or wa/wc = 1.517. That is, principals earn 51.7% more than
teachers in Texas.
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Table 31. The Probability of Promotion Model
Variable Estimate St. Error
Experience 0.007*** 0.000
Male -0.001 0.006
Hispanic 0.005 0.007
African American -0.047*** 0.010
Asian -0.157** 0.065
Native -0.066 0.051
Open Positions 0.006*** 0.001
Number Certified -0.001*** 0.000
Age of Cert. 0.024*** 0.009
LR statistic 7,738
p-value 0.001
Pseudo R2 0.298
Notes: This table shows the estimated probability of promotion
model. Data covers school years 1994-1995 through 2003-2004 in
Texas. OpenPositions is the number of open administration posi-
tions in the school district that year. NumberCertified is the num-
ber of other individuals in the district that hold a principal certificate.
AgeofCert. is the number of years since an individual’s certification
was first issued. The number of observations for this model is 249,889.
An ’*’ indicates estimates significant at a 90% level; ’**’ indicates a
95% significance level; and ’***’ indicates a 99% significance level.
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Table 32. Entry and Education, Models 1 & 2 with Murphy-Topel Errors
Variable Estimate St. Error Murphy-Topel
Model 1
New Regime 0.693 0.0270*** 0.0270***
Bachelor’s Degree 0.601 0.0243*** 0.0245***
[Bach.]*[New Regime] -0.585 0.0269*** 0.0270***
Master’s Degree 1.972 0.0257*** 0.0280***
[Mast.]*[New Regime] -0.633 0.0265*** 0.0266***
Doctorate 2.488 0.0323*** 0.0370***
[Doc.]*[New Regime] -0.789 0.0342*** 0.0343***
Male 0.316 0.0054*** 0.0088***
Experience -0.044 0.0006*** 0.0010***
Wage Premium 0.182 0.0643*** 0.1022*
Prob. Of Promotion 28.758 0.0671*** 0.1298***
Model 2
New Regime 0.718 0.0277*** 0.0278***
Bachelor’s Degree 0.857 0.0250*** 0.0252***
[Bach.]*[New Regime] -0.609 0.0276*** 0.0277***
Master’s Degree 2.658 0.0269*** 0.0273***
[Mast.]*[New Regime] -0.66 0.0272*** 0.0273***
Doctorate 3.492 0.0342*** 0.0348***
[Doc.]*[New Regime] -0.837 0.0355*** 0.0356***
Male 0.550 0.0059*** 0.0081***
Experience -0.025 0.0006*** 0.0009***
Wage Premium 3.717 0.0722*** 0.0751***
Prob. Of Promotion 34.529 0.0788*** 0.1594***
Notes: This table shows the estimated coefficients, the naive standard errors, and the
Murphy & Topel (1985) corrected standard errors for the probability of entry model.
Data covers school years 1994-1995 through 2003-2004 in Texas. An ’*’ indicates
estimates significant at a 90% level; ’**’ indicates a 95% significance level; and ’***’
indicates a 99% significance level. Regressions also include controls for year and/or
race.
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Table 33. Entry and Education, Models 3 & 4 with Murphy-Topel Errors
Variable Estimate St. Error Murphy-Topel
Model 3
New Regime 0.722 0.0277*** 0.0278***
Bachelor’s Degree 0.541 0.0250*** 0.0252***
[Bach.]*[New Regime] -0.610 0.0277*** 0.0277***
Master’s Degree 2.260 0.0257*** 0.0269***
[Mast.]*[New Regime] -0.637 0.0273*** 0.0274***
Doctorate 3.094 0.0313*** 0.0333***
[Doc.]*[New Regime] -0.798 0.0349*** 0.0349***
Male 0.540 0.0045*** 0.0072***
Wage Premium 3.352 0.0462*** 0.0682***
Prob. Of Promotion 28.626 0.0665*** 0.1278***
Model 4
New Regime 0.742 0.0284*** 0.0285***
Bachelor’s Degree 0.772 0.0256*** 0.0259***
[Bach.]*[New Regime] -0.622 0.0283*** 0.0284***
Master’s Degree 2.817 0.0266*** 0.0271***
[Mast.]*[New Regime] -0.652 0.0279*** 0.0280***
Doctorate 3.901 0.0327*** 0.0332***
[Doc.]*[New Regime] -0.833 0.0362*** 0.0362***
Male 0.723 0.0048*** 0.0073***
Wage Premium 6.063 0.0504*** 0.0534***
Prob. Of Promotion 34.661 0.0785*** 0.1584***
Notes: This table shows the estimated coefficients, the naive standard errors, and the
Murphy & Topel (1985) corrected standard errors for the probability of entry model.
Data covers school years 1994-1995 through 2003-2004 in Texas. An ’*’ indicates
estimates significant at a 90% level; ’**’ indicates a 95% significance level; and ’***’
indicates a 99% significance level. Regressions also include controls for school year,
experience, and/or race.
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Table 34. Entry and 4th Grade Test Scores with Murphy-Topel Errors
Variable Estimate St. Error Murphy-Topel
4th Grade Math
New Regime 0.059 0.0002*** 0.0002***
∆ Score -0.028 0.0001*** 0.0001***
[∆ Score]*[New Regime] 0.065 0.0001*** 0.0001***
Bachelor’s Degree 0.347 0.0044*** 0.0044***
Master’s Degree 1.891 0.0047*** 0.0047***
Doctorate 2.712 0.0069*** 0.0070***
Male 0.631 0.0002*** 0.0002***
Wage Premium 2.276 0.0159*** 0.0171***
Prob. Of Promotion 20.877 0.0290*** 0.0348***
4th Grade Reading
New Regime 0.095 0.0148*** 0.0149***
∆ Score -0.026 0.0082*** 0.0082***
[∆ Score]*[New Regime] 0.069 0.0125*** 0.0125***
Bachelor’s Degree 0.349 0.0660*** 0.0660***
Master’s Degree 1.892 0.0686*** 0.0689***
Doctorate 2.714 0.0833*** 0.0837***
Male 0.630 0.0138*** 0.0143***
Wage Premium 2.279 0.1260*** 0.1306***
Prob. Of Promotion 20.880 0.1702*** 0.1864***
Notes: This table shows the estimated coefficients, the naive standard errors, and the
Murphy & Topel (1985) corrected standard errors for the probability of entry model.
Data covers school years 1994-1995 through 2001-2002 in Texas. An ’*’ indicates
estimates significant at a 90% level; ’**’ indicates a 95% significance level; and ’***’
indicates a 99% significance level. Regressions also include controls for school year
and experience.
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Table 35. Entry and 5th Grade Test Scores with Murphy-Topel Errors
Variable Estimate St. Error Murphy-Topel
5th Grade Math
New Regime 0.092 0.0151*** 0.0151***
∆ Score -0.016 0.0079** 0.0079**
[∆ Score]*[New Regime] 0.051 0.0123*** 0.0123***
Bachelor’s Degree 0.321 0.0666*** 0.0666***
Master’s Degree 1.864 0.0692*** 0.0694***
Doctorate 2.693 0.0841*** 0.0844***
Male 0.574 0.0138*** 0.0143***
Wage Premium 2.252 0.1278*** 0.1324***
Prob. Of Promotion 20.892 0.1712*** 0.1869***
5th Grade Reading
New Regime 0.091 0.0151*** 0.0151***
∆ Score -0.023 0.0084*** 0.0084***
[∆ Score]*[New Regime] 0.052 0.0130*** 0.0130***
Bachelor’s Degree 0.322 0.0666*** 0.0666***
Master’s Degree 1.865 0.0692*** 0.0694***
Doctorate 2.694 0.0841*** 0.0844***
Male 0.574 0.0138*** 0.0143***
Wage Premium 2.252 0.1278*** 0.1324***
Prob. Of Promotion 20.883 0.1712*** 0.1868***
Notes: This table shows the estimated coefficients, the naive standard errors, and the
Murphy & Topel (1985) corrected standard errors for the probability of entry model.
Data covers school years 1994-1995 through 2001-2002 in Texas. An ’*’ indicates
estimates significant at a 90% level; ’**’ indicates a 95% significance level; and ’***’
indicates a 99% significance level. Regressions also include controls for school year
and experience.
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Table 36. Entry and 6th Grade Test Scores with Murphy-Topel Errors
Variable Estimate St. Error Murphy-Topel
6th Grade Math
New Regime 0.009 0.0169 0.0169
∆ Score -0.023 0.0100** 0.0100**
[∆ Score]*[New Regime] 0.083 0.0165*** 0.0165***
Bachelor’s Degree 0.201 0.0719*** 0.0719***
Master’s Degree 1.747 0.0751*** 0.0754***
Doctorate 2.411 0.0904*** 0.0908***
Male 0.491 0.0139*** 0.0145***
Wage Premium 2.406 0.1442*** 0.1495***
Prob. Of Promotion 23.082 0.1987*** 0.2155***
6th Grade Reading
New Regime 0.010 0.0169 0.0169
∆ Score -0.016 0.0105 0.0105
[∆ Score]*[New Regime] 0.048 0.0168*** 0.0168***
Bachelor’s Degree 0.202 0.0720*** 0.0720***
Master’s Degree 1.749 0.0752*** 0.0754***
Doctorate 2.414 0.0904*** 0.0909***
Male 0.492 0.0139*** 0.0145***
Wage Premium 2.412 0.1443*** 0.1495***
Prob. Of Promotion 23.076 0.1987*** 0.2156***
Notes: This table shows the estimated coefficients, the naive standard errors, and the
Murphy & Topel (1985) corrected standard errors for the probability of entry model.
Data covers school years 1994-1995 through 2001-2002 in Texas. An ’*’ indicates
estimates significant at a 90% level; ’**’ indicates a 95% significance level; and ’***’
indicates a 99% significance level. Regressions also include controls for school year
and experience.
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Table 37. Entry and 7th Grade Test Scores with Murphy-Topel Errors
Variable Estimate St. Error Murphy-Topel
7th Grade Math
New Regime 0.064 0.0186*** 0.0187***
∆ Score 0.008 0.0122 0.0122
[∆ Score]*[New Regime] 0.000 0.0198 0.0198
Bachelor’s Degree 0.279 0.0872*** 0.0872***
Master’s Degree 1.789 0.0902*** 0.0906***
Doctorate 2.360 0.1050*** 0.1057***
Male 0.428 0.0147*** 0.0157***
Wage Premium 2.335 0.1549*** 0.1645***
Prob. Of Promotion 28.366 0.2456*** 0.2679***
7th Grade Reading
New Regime 0.016 0.0185 0.0185
∆ Score -0.009 0.0119 0.0119
[∆ Score]*[New Regime] 0.019 0.0194 0.0194
Bachelor’s Degree 0.279 0.0872*** 0.0872***
Master’s Degree 1.788 0.0902*** 0.0906***
Doctorate 2.358 0.1050*** 0.1057***
Male 0.428 0.0147*** 0.0157***
Wage Premium 2.330 0.1549*** 0.1645***
Prob. Of Promotion 28.360 0.2456*** 0.2679***
Notes: This table shows the estimated coefficients, the naive standard errors, and the
Murphy & Topel (1985) corrected standard errors for the probability of entry model.
Data covers school years 1994-1995 through 2001-2002 in Texas. An ’*’ indicates
estimates significant at a 90% level; ’**’ indicates a 95% significance level; and ’***’
indicates a 99% significance level. Regressions also include controls for school year
and experience.
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Table 38. Entry and 8th Grade Test Scores with Murphy-Topel Errors
Variable Estimate St. Error Murphy-Topel
8th Grade Math
New Regime 0.063 0.0186*** 0.0186***
∆ Score -0.003 0.0126 0.0126
[∆ Score]*[New Regime] 0.036 0.0199** 0.0199**
Bachelor’s Degree 0.289 0.0871*** 0.0871***
Master’s Degree 1.796 0.0900*** 0.0904***
Doctorate 2.363 0.1048*** 0.1054***
Male 0.426 0.0146*** 0.0156***
Wage Premium 2.359 0.1542*** 0.1634***
Prob. Of Promotion 28.349 0.2445*** 0.2669***
8th Grade Reading
New Regime 0.015 0.0184 0.0184
∆ Score -0.003 0.0124 0.0124
[∆ Score]*[New Regime] 0.004 0.0190 0.0190
Bachelor’s Degree 0.288 0.0869*** 0.0869***
Master’s Degree 1.796 0.0899*** 0.0903***
Doctorate 2.363 0.1046*** 0.1052***
Male 0.426 0.0146*** 0.0156***
Wage Premium 2.360 0.1541*** 0.1634***
Prob. Of Promotion 28.341 0.2444*** 0.2668***
Notes: This table shows the estimated coefficients, the naive standard errors, and the
Murphy & Topel (1985) corrected standard errors for the probability of entry model.
Data covers school years 1994-1995 through 2001-2002 in Texas. An ’*’ indicates
estimates significant at a 90% level; ’**’ indicates a 95% significance level; and ’***’
indicates a 99% significance level. Regressions also include controls for school year
and experience.
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Table 39. Entry and 10th Grade Test Scores with Murphy-Topel Errors
Variable Estimate St. Error Murphy-Topel
10th Grade Math
New Regime 0.003 0.0160 0.0160
∆ Score 0.032 0.0121*** 0.0121***
[∆ Score]*[New Regime] -0.039 0.0178** 0.0178**
Bachelor’s Degree 0.381 0.0664*** 0.0665***
Master’s Degree 2.042 0.0699*** 0.0702***
Doctorate 2.695 0.0823*** 0.0829***
Male 0.486 0.0138*** 0.0147***
Wage Premium 4.520 0.1479*** 0.1528***
Prob. Of Promotion 31.661 0.2407*** 0.2668***
10th Grade Reading
New Regime 0.091 0.0165*** 0.0165***
∆ Score 0.014 0.0122 0.0122
[∆ Score]*[New Regime] -0.002 0.0178 0.0178
Bachelor’s Degree 0.380 0.0664*** 0.0665***
Master’s Degree 2.039 0.0699*** 0.0702***
Doctorate 2.691 0.0823*** 0.0829***
Male 0.484 0.0138*** 0.0147***
Wage Premium 4.507 0.1478*** 0.1527***
Prob. Of Promotion 31.654 0.2406*** 0.2668***
Notes: This table shows the estimated coefficients, the naive standard errors, and the
Murphy & Topel (1985) corrected standard errors for the probability of entry model.
Data covers school years 1994-1995 through 2001-2002 in Texas. An ’*’ indicates
estimates significant at a 90% level; ’**’ indicates a 95% significance level; and ’***’
indicates a 99% significance level. Regressions also include controls for school year
and experience.
111
Table 40. Principal Entry and Standardized Test Scores, Teachers and Students
Matched by Campus, Grade, and Subject, with Murphy-Topel Errors
Variable Estimate St. Error Murphy-Topel
Standardized Test Scores
New Regime -0.003 0.0269 0.0269
∆ Score -0.032 0.0163** 0.0163**
[∆ Score]*[New Regime] 0.081 0.0242*** 0.0242***
Bachelor’s Degree 0.358 0.1558** 0.1558**
Master’s Degree 2.303 0.1597*** 0.1597***
Doctorate 3.061 0.1788*** 0.1789***
Male 0.666 0.0218*** 0.0223***
Wage Premium 5.143 0.2236*** 0.2240***
Exp. 6-10 0.410 0.0225*** 0.0225***
Exp. 11-15 0.234 0.0296*** 0.0298***
Exp. 16-20 0.055 0.0373 0.0377
Exp. 20+ -0.245 0.0498*** 0.0505***
Native American 0.927 0.1022*** 0.1075***
Asian American 1.844 0.1144*** 0.1190***
African American 1.131 0.0202*** 0.0214***
Hispanic 0.344 0.0192*** 0.0200***
Prob. Of Promotion 31.066 0.3619*** 0.3774***
Notes: This table shows the estimated coefficients, the naive standard errors, and the
Murphy & Topel (1985) corrected standard errors for the probability of entry model.
Data covers school years 1994-1995 through 2001-2002 in Texas. An ’*’ indicates
estimates significant at a 90% level; ’**’ indicates a 95% significance level; and ’***’
indicates a 99% significance level. Regressions also include controls for school year.
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Table 41. Principal Entry and Test Scores Percentiles, Teachers and Students Matched
by Campus, Grade, and Subject, with Murphy-Topel Errors
Variable Estimate St. Error Murphy-Topel
Test Scores Percentiles
New Regime -0.003 0.0269 0.0269
∆ Score -0.105 0.0545** 0.0545**
[∆ Score]*[New Regime] 0.215 0.0797*** 0.0798***
Bachelor’s Degree 0.359 0.1559** 0.1559**
Master’s Degree 2.304 0.1598*** 0.1598***
Doctorate 3.061 0.1789*** 0.1790***
Male 0.666 0.0218*** 0.0223***
Wage Premium 5.139 0.2236*** 0.2240***
Exp. 6-10 0.410 0.0225*** 0.0225***
Exp. 11-15 0.233 0.0296*** 0.0298***
Exp. 16-20 0.055 0.0373 0.0377
Exp. 20+ -0.246 0.0498*** 0.0505***
Native American 0.927 0.1022*** 0.1075***
Asian American 1.843 0.1145*** 0.1191***
African American 1.131 0.0202*** 0.0214***
Hispanic 0.343 0.0192*** 0.0200***
Prob. Of Promotion 31.062 0.3619*** 0.3774***
Notes: This table shows the estimated coefficients, the naive standard errors, and the
Murphy & Topel (1985) corrected standard errors for the probability of entry model.
Data covers school years 1994-1995 through 2001-2002 in Texas. An ’*’ indicates
estimates significant at a 90% level; ’**’ indicates a 95% significance level; and ’***’
indicates a 99% significance level. Regressions also include controls for school year.
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Table 42. Principal Entry and Rank-Based Z-Scores, Teachers and Students Matched
by Campus, Grade, and Subject, with Murphy-Topel Errors
Variable Estimate St. Error Murphy-Topel
Rank-Based Z-Scores
New Regime -0.003 0.0269 0.0269
∆ Score -0.033 0.0165** 0.0165**
[∆ Score]*[New Regime] 0.070 0.0241*** 0.0241***
Bachelor’s Degree 0.359 0.1558** 0.1558**
Master’s Degree 2.303 0.1597*** 0.1597***
Doctorate 3.061 0.1789*** 0.1789***
Male 0.666 0.0218*** 0.0223***
Wage Premium 5.141 0.2236*** 0.2240***
Exp. 6-10 0.410 0.0225*** 0.0225***
Exp. 11-15 0.233 0.0296*** 0.0298***
Exp. 16-20 0.055 0.0373 0.0377
Exp. 20+ -0.245 0.0498*** 0.0505***
Native American 0.927 0.1022*** 0.1075***
Asian American 1.843 0.1145*** 0.1191***
African American 1.130 0.0202*** 0.0214***
Hispanic 0.344 0.0192*** 0.0200***
Prob. Of Promotion 31.057 0.3619*** 0.3774***
Notes: This table shows the estimated coefficients, the naive standard errors, and the
Murphy & Topel (1985) corrected standard errors for the probability of entry model.
Data covers school years 1994-1995 through 2001-2002 in Texas. An ’*’ indicates
estimates significant at a 90% level; ’**’ indicates a 95% significance level; and ’***’
indicates a 99% significance level. Regressions also include controls for school year.
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Table 43. Principal Entry and Standardized Test Scores, Natural Experiment Design
with Murphy-Topel Errors
Variable Estimate St. Error Murphy-Topel
Treatment Group
New Regime -0.010 0.1350 0.1351
∆ Score -0.088 0.0553 0.0554
[∆ Score]*[New Regime] 0.172 0.0892** 0.0893**
Bachelor’s Degree 4.671 3.0084 3.0084
Master’s Degree 6.977 3.0020** 3.0020**
Male 1.271 0.1029*** 0.1053***
Wage Premium 10.645 1.0980*** 1.1023***
Prob. Of Promotion 138.325 6.3768*** 6.3991***
Control Group
New Regime 0.174 0.2969 0.3302
∆ Score -0.078 0.1378 0.1395
[∆ Score]*[New Regime] -0.049 0.1835 0.1875
Master’s Degree 6.139 0.3934*** 0.6256***
Male 1.315 0.2729*** 0.4553***
Wage Premium 19.184 2.8375*** 5.0457***
Prob. Of Promotion 157.338 15.3532*** 44.1988***
Notes: This table shows the estimated coefficients, the naive standard errors, and the
Murphy & Topel (1985) corrected standard errors for the probability of entry model.
Data covers school years 1994-1995 through 2001-2002 in Texas. An ’*’ indicates
estimates significant at a 90% level; ’**’ indicates a 95% significance level; and ’***’
indicates a 99% significance level. Regressions also include controls for school year,
experience, and race.
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Table 44. Principal Entry and Test Score Percentiles, Natural Experiment Design with
Murphy-Topel Errors
Variable Estimate St. Error Murphy-Topel
Treatment Group
New Regime -0.093 0.1327 0.1328
∆ Score -0.404 0.1816** 0.1819**
[∆ Score]*[New Regime] 0.520 0.2936* 0.2938*
Bachelor’s Degree 4.666 3.1421 3.1422
Master’s Degree 6.973 3.1360** 3.1361**
Male 1.271 0.1030*** 0.1053***
Wage Premium 10.634 1.0985*** 1.1029***
Prob. Of Promotion 138.370 6.3855*** 6.4083***
Control Group
New Regime 0.168 0.2962 0.3252
∆ Score -0.243 0.4328 0.4369
[∆ Score]*[New Regime] -0.167 0.5762 0.5963
Bachelor’s Degree 3.455 0.3935*** 0.6224***
Male 1.314 0.2734*** 0.4284***
Wage Premium 19.217 2.8379*** 5.2778***
Prob. Of Promotion 157.356 15.3817*** 38.9286***
Notes: This table shows the estimated coefficients, the naive standard errors, and the
Murphy & Topel (1985) corrected standard errors for the probability of entry model.
Data covers school years 1994-1995 through 2001-2002 in Texas. An ’*’ indicates
estimates significant at a 90% level; ’**’ indicates a 95% significance level; and ’***’
indicates a 99% significance level. Regressions also include controls for school year,
experience, and race.
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Table 45. Principal Entry and Rank-Based Z-Scores, Natural Experiment Design with
Murphy-Topel Errors
Variable Estimate St. Error Murphy-Topel
Treatment Group
New Regime -0.103 0.1330 0.1332
∆ Score -0.095 0.0542* 0.0543*
[∆ Score]*[New Regime] 0.151 0.0862* 0.0863*
Bachelor’s Degree 4.671 3.0156 3.0156
Master’s Degree 6.974 3.0092** 3.0093**
Male 1.268 0.1031*** 0.1055***
Wage Premium 10.621 1.0987*** 1.103***
Prob. Of Promotion 138.144 6.3752*** 6.3976***
Control Group
New Regime 0.188 0.2984 0.3326
∆ Score -0.112 0.1191 0.1202
[∆ Score]*[New Regime] -0.004 0.1593 0.1631
Bachelor’s Degree 3.282 0.3929*** 0.6209***
Male 1.311 0.2735*** 0.4276***
Wage Premium 19.158 2.8339*** 5.2698***
Prob. Of Promotion 157.244 15.3007*** 38.7948***
Notes: This table shows the estimated coefficients, the naive standard errors, and the
Murphy & Topel (1985) corrected standard errors for the probability of entry model.
Data covers school years 1994-1995 through 2001-2002 in Texas. An ’*’ indicates
estimates significant at a 90% level; ’**’ indicates a 95% significance level; and ’***’
indicates a 99% significance level. Regressions also include controls for school year,
experience, and race.
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Table 46. Teacher Exit Rates
Leaving Education
Experience All Employees Teachers Certified
Less than 5 years 0.332 0.428 0.060
5 to 10 years 0.174 0.181 0.115
10 to 15 years 0.141 0.114 0.121
15 to 20 years 0.129 0.090 0.149
More than 20 years 0.224 0.187 0.554
Notes: The first column shows characteristics of all employees in
Texas public schools. The second column shows statistics on teach-
ers upon exit from Texas public schools. The third column shows
statistics on certified individuals upon exit. Data covers school years
1994-1995 through 2003-2004 in Texas.
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APPENDIX D
SUPPLEMENTARY FIGURE FOR CHAPTER III
 
Fig. 10. Locations of Traditional and Alternative Training Facilities
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APPENDIX E
SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES FOR CHAPTER IV
Table 47. Estimates of the Log-Earnings Equation, Robust Standard Errors; Market
and Individual Characteristics
Clustering on: Individual Labor Market
Market Characteristics
Index of Choice 0.062*** 0.062**
0.006 0.026
Urban District 0.029*** 0.029***
0.004 0.013
Log(Avg. Housing Price) 0.047*** 0.047***
0.004 0.021
Individual Characteristics
Age 0.005*** 0.005***
0.000 0.001
Experience 0.005*** 0.005***
0.000 0.001
Black -0.009*** -0.009***
0.003 0.006
Hispanic 0.021*** 0.021***
0.003 0.004
Asian -0.015 -0.015
0.020 0.011
Male 0.034*** 0.034***
0.002 0.004
High School Diploma 0.002 0.002
0.007 0.020
Master’s Degree 0.056*** 0.056***
0.003 0.006
Doctorate 0.150*** 0.150***
0.006 0.006
Notes: Results of the above models are continued in the next table. The column
labeled Individual reports robust standard errors where clustering is on an individual
in the data. The column labeled LaborMarket reports robust standard error where
clustering is on a labor market. An ’*’ indicates estimates significant at a 90% level;
’**’ indicates a 95% significance level; and ’***’ indicates a 99% significance level.
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Table 48. Estimates of the Log-Earnings Equation, Robust Standard Errors; District
Characteristics
Clustering on: Individual Labor Market
District Characteristics
TAAS Performance 0.001*** 0.001***
0.000 0.001
District Enrollment(1,000’s) 0.000*** 0.000***
0.000 0.000
Special Education 0.305*** 0.305
0.078 0.435
Immigrants 0.568*** 0.568**
0.046 0.281
Economically Disadvantaged -0.025*** -0.025
0.007 0.039
School Year Dummies
1999-00 0.047*** 0.047***
0.001 0.003
2000-01 0.076*** 0.076***
0.001 0.006
2001-02 0.095*** 0.095***
0.002 0.006
2002-03 0.104*** 0.104***
0.002 0.006
Notes: Results of the above models are continued from the previous table. The vari-
able TAASPerformance measures the fraction of students in the school district that
passed all the required TAAS examinations. SpecialEducation measures the percent-
age of students in the district who require special needs. Immigrants measures the
percentage of students in the district that have immigrated from a foreign country.
EconomicallyDisadvantaged is a variable that measures the percentage of students
who are poor. An ’*’ indicates estimates significant at a 90% level; ’**’ indicates a
95% significance level; and ’***’ indicates a 99% significance level.
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